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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF' THE STATE OF IDAHO 
State of Idaho, 
PlaintifffRespondent 
vs . SUPREME COURT 
NO. 35285 
James Cochran, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho. 
HONORABLE Jeff Brudie 
Attorney General's Office 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 N. Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-6914 
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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
JONATHON D. HALLIN 
WILCOX & MALLIN. PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
200 Park Street 
P.O. Box 947 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
Telephone: (208) 634-71 18 
Facsimile: (208) 634-5880 
wilcox.hallin@frontiernet.net 
ISB # 7253 
FILED 
A T ~ Q C L O C K  
DEC - 4 2006 
URT 
DEPUTY 
1, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAJ3O 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR-2006-32068 
1 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. 
) HALLlN IN SUPPORT OF 
VS. ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) VACATE TRIAL SETTING 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Idaho ) 
JONATHON DAVID HALLIN, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says as 
follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 1 
That 1 am a member of the firm WILGOX & HALLIN, PLLC, Defendant's 
counsel of record in the above-entitled action, and consequently have personal 
knowledge concerning the facts of this case. 
That on September 29,2006, this firm was appointed to represent Mr. Cochran in 
the above-captioned matter. 
That on November 20,2006,I had a conference with Mr. Cochran in anticipation 
of the Jury Trial scheduled in this matter on December 18,2006. 
During said conference, Mr. Cochran advised me that he had recently learned of 
two other persons whom may have been accused of similar behavior by the 
alleged victim in this matter. 
That Mr. Cochran informed Counsel that said persons are Fred Hendron, believed 
to be residing at McCoy's Trailer Court, Kooskia, Idaho, and Mr. Hixon, whom is 
believed to reside in Washington State. 
That I advised my client to diligently attempt to locate a full name for Mr. Hixon 
and his place of residence. 
To date, Mr. Hixon has not been located, nor has his full name been determined. 
That Mr. Cochran informed counsel that Mr. Hendron is reluctant to either testify 
or speak with counsel regarding this matter. 
At this juncture, Counsel believes that Mr. Hixon and Mr. Hendron are material 
witnesses. 
At this juncture, Counsel does not reasonably believe that he will be able to locate 
Mr. Hixon, interview him, and possibly have him subpoenaed, prior to December 
18,2006. 
Further, Counsel reasonably believes that the assistance of a private investigator is 
necessary to locate Mr. Hixon. 
After exercising due diligence, Counsel has determined that he cannot reasonably 
be prepared by December 18,2006, the current trial setting in this matter. 
That Counsel has spoken with Mr. Cochran about the foregoing, and he agrees 
with Counsel's decision to request that the current trial setting be vacated and 
reset. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 2 
14. Based on the foregoing, Counsel requests that this matter be rescheduled. 
Further sayeth naught 
DATED this f December, 2006. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ?*day of December, 2006. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the of December, 2006, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below to the 
following persons: 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Certified Mail 
( ) Federal Express 
(x) FacsirniIe 
( ) Hand Delivery 
. . 
SIGNED: 
Justin D. Whatcott 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-00 10 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 4 
JONATHON D. WALLIN 
WILCOX & HALLIN, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
200 Park Street 
P.O. Box 947 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
Telephone: (208) 634-71 18 
Facsimile: (208) 634-5880 
wilcox.hallin@frontiemet.net 
ISB # 7253 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR-2006-32068 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
) INSTRUCTIONS (1 -5) 
VS. 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, JAMES A. COCHRAN, by and through his attorney of 
record, Jonathon D. Hallin, of the firm, Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC, and hereby submits his 
proposed jury instructions Numbers 1 through 5. 
DEFENDANT'S WQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden 
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the 
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the most 
important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
ICJI 103A 
DEFENDANT'S EQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 2 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
A defendmt in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testiQ. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice md assistance of 
the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant 
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any 
way. 
GIVEN 
EFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
ICJI 301 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
As members of the jury, it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those 
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented 
in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in 
their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is included to help you 
interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from 
the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed to 
disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
ICJI 202 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 4 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You cannot find the defendant guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct unless the 
circumstances proved by the evidence are consistent with the theory that he committed the crime 
charged and they cannot be reconciled with any rational theory of his innocence. If the evidence 
is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and 
the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the 
defendant's innocence, and to reject the other which points to his guilt. In addition, each fact 
which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to estabIish the defendant's guilt 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
ICJI 203 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 5 
PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"'Expert witness[es] may not give an opinion as to the credibility of a particular witness." 
Consequendy, you shall disregard all testimony by all witnesses, lay andlor expert, which is 
nothing more than an assessment of the alleged victim's credibility. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Sfate v. Blachtead, 126 Idaho 14'2 1 (1 994), ICJI 302, us modified. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 6 
>%y o f  February, 2007 SUBMITTED this 
VVIfiCOX & WALLIN, PLLC 
By: 
M m e y s  for Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the -1 i day of February, 2007,l caused a true and conect copy 
of the above and foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below to the 
following persons: 
(x) U.S.Mai1 
( ) Certified Mail 
( ) Federal Express 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Box 
Justin D. Whatcott 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-00 10 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
SIGNED: 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 8 
dig*g 
~~~% 
re2- ORlGlNAL 
IDAHO COUN ["I' DISTRICT COilRT 
f ! ! f D  
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Pi 
- C! CI OCK L.M. 
Idaho Aftorney General FEB 1 4 2007 
STEPHEN A. BYVVATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JUSTIN D. WHATCOTT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES COCHRAN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR-06-32068 
) 
) STATE'S REQUESTED 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy 
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and 
does hereby request the attached jury instructions be given in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this (2% day of February, 2007. 
~&uQdttorne~ General 
STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this gfl day of , 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Requested Jury Instructions to: 
Jonathon Hallin 
Wiicox & Hallin 
200 Park Street 
P.O. Box 947 
McCall, ID 83638 
Fax (208) 634-5880 
$ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
- 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- 
Facsimile 
4l'osean Newman, Legal Secretary 
STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 3oth day of March, 2006 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. The defendant James Cochran committed an act of manual-genital contact upon 
A.J.H. 
4. A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
5. the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or 
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of either of them. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be 
touched. The touching may be through the clothing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law does not require as an essential element of the crime that the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of either the defendant or A.J.H. be actually aroused, 
appealed to, or gratified. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct or to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor that A.J.H. may have consented to 
the alleged conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
If your unanimous verdict is that the defendant is not guilty of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct, you must acquit the defendant of that charge. In that event, you must next 
consider the included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 3oth day of March, 2006, 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. The defendant James Cochran caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H., not 
amounting to lewd conduct 
4. The defendant was eighteen (1 8) years of age or older, 
5. A.J.H. was under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
6. The defendant did such act with the specific intent to gratify the sexual desire of the 
defendant, of such child, or of some other person. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In these jury instructions, the following words have the meanings stated: 
"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the actor, or between 
children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self contact, 
any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other 
person. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions. Although 
the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they are part of my instructions 
to you. I will now read the verdict form to you. It states: 
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us 
as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should simply 
sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered Question No. I 
"Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should sign 
the verdict form as explained in another instruction. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-06-32068 
Plaintiff, ) 
) VERDICT 
VS. ) 
1 
JAMES COCHRAN, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled action, for 
our verdict, unanimously answer the question(s) submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and 
Lascivious Conduct in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should 
simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered 
Question No. 1 "Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse 
of a Minor in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
Next, you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. 
DATED this day of ,2006 
Presiding Juror 
ldaho Attorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
p FILED / 1 
AT * \ l d  O'CLOCK .M, 
JUSTIN D. WHATCOm 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-00 10 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES COCHRAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-06-32068 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy 
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and 
does hereby object to the Defendant's proposed jury instructions 4 and 5, upon the 
following grounds: 
1. The Defendant's proposed jury instruction 4 is an instruction known as the 
"Holder" instruction, listed as lCJl 203, and arising from State v. Holder, 100 ldaho 
129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979). The decision in Holder was overruled in State v. 
Humphrevs, 134 ldaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). As such, lCJl 203 now states 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Page 1 --= -s% 
C% - 
--,. 1 1  
. ' & * 
"That instruction, which became known as the "Holder" instruction, should no 
longer be given." Therefore, the "Holder" instruction is no longer good law in Idaho 
and thus the Defendant's proposed jury instruction 4 should not be given. 
2. The Defendant's proposed instruction 5 purports to instruct the jury to disregard 
any testimony which is a comment on the alleged victim's credibility. Due to the 
fact that no witness is permitted to testify regarding opinions as to the credibility of 
any other witnesses, such evidence is not admissible. As such, the Court should 
prevent any such testimony, and the Defendant's proposed instruction 5 is 
unnecessary. In the event that testimony of this type is elicited, the Court can 
instruct the jury to disregard that testimony at that time. 
Therefore, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny the Defendant's 
proposed jury instructions 4 and 5. Additional oral argument regarding this request shall 
be made at the jury instruction conference held prior to the instructing of the jury in this 
case. 
DATED this lzUday of February, 2007. 
DB ut Attorney General fd 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Page 2 a** 
We 2 6  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ay of 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Defendant's 
Requested Jury Instructions to: 
Jonathon Hallin 
Wilcox & Hallin 
200 Park Street 
P.O. Box 947 
McCall, ID 83638 
' U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
-
- 
Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- Facsimile 
Fax (208) 634-5880 
/ 
wosean Newman, Legal Secretary 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Page 3 L kf, 
& 'i*I 
' 62 8 
D m y  J, Radalcovich 
Radakovich b w  Office 
Attorney for Def'endmt 
1624 C Street 
Lewiston, Id&o 83501 
(208) 746-8 162 
Idaho State Bar #I  991 
D&NNV J RADAKOVICW PAGE 04 
IDAI-10 COLbJTY EISTRICT CQURT 
ROSk f GLtiFIING 
Of-qSl l i lCT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF DmO, ) CASE NO. CR 2006-32068 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
v. 1 DANNY J. UDAKOVICH 
) 
J M S  A. COCHRAN, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
D M  J. RADAKOVICH, being f i t  duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: 
1. That your afiant has been retained as the attorney for the Defmdant in the above- 
entitled matter; 
2. That the Defendant consulted with your affiant in early December 2006 relative to 
the drafting of ~elrtain tort claim notices; 
3. That, at the time the Defendant consulted with your aMiant relative to the tort claim 
notices, the Defmdant made inquiry of your affiant as to whether ox not your would be 
AFFDAVII' OX: 
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w i l k g  to represent him in the underlying criminal. proceedings; that, at that time, your af"X"1mt quoted 
the Dewdant a retainer which would need to be paid before your affiant would c o m m c e  
rvesentation of the Defeadant in said criminal matters; 
4. That the retainer was substantial md, based on what the Defendant has indicated to 
your affiant, it required a considerable period of time for the Def~ndmt actually accumulate the 
re~nex ;  that the Defendwt. contacted your affiant during the week o f  February 12, 2007, and 
indicated that the retainer had been accumulated; that the retainer was actually paid over to your 
af%lant on February 15,2007; 
5. That your affiant immediately got into contact with Deputy Attorney General, Justin 
Whatcott, to inform him that the Defendant had retained your afiant and, h addition, your affk.int 
spoke with the Defendant's existing attorney, Jonathan Hallin, imd made mmgements for the 
signing of a substitution of counsel document; that, at the same time, your affiant inquired of Mr. 
Hallin as to whether or not he might bonow the file of Mr. Hallin in this matter; that Mx. Hallin was 
willing to allow your affiant to bonow the file, which i s  apparently being mailed to your affjiimt 
today; 
6 .  That your affiant desires to do a proper job in representing the Defendant in said 
matter; that the charge against the Defendant in said matter is serious and carries a significant 
potential penalty; that your affiant believes that, given the delay in obtaining the file of Mr. HaXlin 
and the fact that the file is quite large, requires that the trial in this matter be continued fof a period 
of time in order to allow your afliant to properly prepare to try the case; 
7. Further your affiant saith not. 
AFFXDAVXT OF 
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STATE OFDAHO 
: SS. 
County of N ~ z  Perce ) 
J. RmAKOVICH, being f i s t  duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says: 
That he has read the foregoing document and we 
therein stated are true, as he vetily believes. 
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. , . . , I  ?. .  r: .'.c'J My co~nmission expires. on March 13, 2012. 
J hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was 
faxed to: 
Justin D. Mutcott 
Deputy Attorney Generul 
P. 0. Box 83 720 
RADAKOVICH L A W  OFFICE 
1624 C; Street, 
Lewistvs. 11) 85501 
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UWIREMCE (3. WASDEN 
Idaho ABomey General 
SEPWEN A, BWUAER 
Deputy AAttorney General 
Chief, Criminaf Law Division 
NO. 969 P. 214 
JUSJIN tl. WHATCOTT 
Deputy Amrney GeneraI and 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P.0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idatto 83720401 0 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TH€ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, 
Defendant. 
j Case NO. ~~-06-32a68 
) 
) NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY 
1 TRIAL WITNESSES AND 
1 EXHIBITS 
1 
COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott,. Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, who hereby gives notice to the Court and counsel 
of the State's witnesses and exhibtts, listed below. 
STATE'S WITNESSES 
1. Cochran, Chrissy 
2. Crocker, Doris 
3. Dotson, Susan 
4. Hewlett, Brenda 
5. Hixon, Amanda 
6. Lanoue, Renee 
NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL WI%@$S? fND EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 1 
- t ,  J 
NO. 9 6 9  P. 314 
7. Mealst, Jason (via dr?position) 
8. Meder, S b t t  
9. Quintal, Mike 
10. Renshaw, Joan 
11. Richan, Sarnanrtha 
12. Vichy, Lorna 
13. Yeager, Mydell 
STATE'S EXHIBITS 
DATED this 1 1" day of May, 2007. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
~ e ' w t t o r n e y  General 
Nightgown cotlected from Amanda Hixon 
Register Receipt from Sunset Mart 
Electronic Check Receipt from Sunset Mart 
Documents from Kamiah Credit Union 
Audio of Int. of Amanda Hixon by Jason Mealor - -- 
Audio of Int. of Amanda Mixon by Skott Mealor 
Redacted Audio of Int. of Chrissy Cochran by Joan Renshaw 
NOWCE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL WITN~SSE~ +ND EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 2 
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w u &' 
MAY. 11. 2 0 0 7  4: 54PM ID ATTNY G E N  C R I M D I V  
CEfWlFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CEFtTIfY that on #is day of May, 2007,1 caused to be sewed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Discovery to: 
Danny 3. Radakodch 
Attorney at: Law 
1624 G Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
- U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
- Wand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
w e a n  Newman, Legal Secretary 
+ NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL -.. W\TVWSfSPD EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 3 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 CASE NO. CR-2006-0032068 
1 
PlaintifT, 1 STIPULATION OF FACT 
) 
v. 1 
1 
JAMES ALLEN C O C H W ,  1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COME NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney 
General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, and Defendant James Allen Cochran, 
by and through his attorney of record, Danny J. Radakovich, and hereby enter into this stipulation 
of fact to be admitted at the jury trial in this matter. Specifically, the parties request tfia-t the jury be 
read the following: 
Parties can agree that certain fact are true, thereby eliminating the need for any evidence 
to establish those facts. In this case, the State and the defendant have agreed that the following is 
true: 
(1) Certain items of evidence in this case were sent to a forensic 
laboratory in North Carolina for D.N.A. testing. Specifically, the 
following items were tested for the presence of D.N.A.: 
a. A fitted sheet seizedfiom the bed in the master bedroom of the 
Defendant's home by Detective Mike Quintal of the Idaho County 
Sherzfs Department; 
b. A blanket seized fiom the bed in the master bedroom of the 
Defendant S home by Detective Mike Quintal of the Idaho County 
STIPULATION OF FACT 
RADAKOVICH JAW OFFICE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
s'szeriffs Department; 
c. A second blanket seizedfiom the bed in the master bedroom ofthe 
Defindant's home by lleteetive Mike Quinfal ofthe Idaho County 
Sherzfs Department; 
d. A cowlforter seizedpom the bed in the master bedroom of the 
Defendant's home by Detective Mike Qui~ltat ofthe Idaho County 
Sherifs Deparbment; 
e. A silk nightgown collectedfi.om Amanda Wixon; 
(2) The forensic laboratory was also provided with known D.N.A. samples collected from 
Amanda Hixon and the Defendant; 
(3) The results of the forensic D.N.A. tests and comparisons are as follows: 
a. 'I'he fitted sheet was observed to have nwnerous visible stains, four 
of which were tested for D.N.A.: 
i. Two of the stains tested from the sheet contained a 
D.N.A. profile that is consistent with the D.N.A. 
profile obtained from James Cochran, and he cannot 
be excluded as the source of the genetic material 
found. Amanda Hixon is excluded as a contributor to 
the genetic material in these samples; 
i i. One stain tested from the sheet contained D.N.A. 
that is a mixture of D.N.A. profiles from more than 
one individual, at least one of which is a male. James 
Cochran cannot be excluded as a contributor to the 
genetic material in these samples. Amanda Hixon is 
excluded as a contributor to the genetic material in 
these samples; 
iii. One stain tested from the sheet contained a D.N.A. 
profile that is consistent with originating from A 
STIPULATION OF FACT 
RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
female. Amanda Hixon is excluded as a contributor 
to this sample; 
iv. At the request of the State, additional stains from 
the sheet were not tested; 
b. The first blanket contained two visible stains, each of which 
cantained a D.N.A. profile that is consistent with the D.N.A. profile 
obtained from James Cochran, and he cannot be excluded as the 
source of the genetic material found. Amanda Hixon is excluded as 
a contributor to the genetic material in these samples; 
c. The second blanket contained one visible stain which contained a 
mixture of D.N.A. from more than one individual, at least one of 
which is a male. James Cochran cannot be excluded as the source of 
the genetic material found. Amanda Hixon is excluded as a 
contributor to the genetic material in these samples; 
d. The comforter contained two visible stains: 
i. The furst stain contained a D.N.A. profile that is 
consistent with the D.N.A. profile obtained from 
James Cochran, and he cannot be excluded as the 
source of the genetic material found. Amanda Hixon 
is excluded as a contributor to the genetic material in 
these samples; 
ii. The second stain contained a D.N.A. profile that is 
consistent with originating from a female. Amanda 
Hixon is excluded as a contributor to this sample; 
e. The nightgown contained two visible stains: 
i. The first stain tested negative for the presence of 
blood, but contained a D.N.A. profile that is 
consistent with the D.N.A. obtained from Amanda 
STIPULATION OF FACT 
RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Hixon. J m e s  Cochran is excluded as a source ofthe 
genetic material in this sample. The probability of 
randomly selecting an unrelated individual with this 
D.N.A. profile is approximately 1 in greater than 
one in greater than 6.5 billion), or 1 in 
greater than the approximate world population; 
ii. The second stain tested positive for blood and 
contained a D.N.A. profile from a female source 
digerent than the first stain. Amanda Hixon is 
excluded as the source of the genetic material in this 
sample. 
You are to accept the agreed-upon facts as being true, and are to consider them along with 
all the other evidence admitted during the trial. You should draw no inferences on the identity of 
the additional stains, other than what has been set forth herein. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 2007. 
STIPULATION OF FACT 
RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
James A. Cochran 11, 
Defendant. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT 
,- , 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Members of the Jury: 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the 
law. You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you even if you disagree or don't 
understand the reasons for some of the rules. 
The law you are to apply in deciding this case is given to you in these instructions, which 
you must follow regardless of your previous ideas or impressions. 
You should consider all instructions together as a whole and not put emphasis on some 
and disregard others. If in these instructions 1 state any rule of law or other proposition in 
varying ways or more than once, I have intended no emphasis and no emphasis should be 
inferred by you. The order in which these instructions are given has no significance as to their 
relative importance. 
You are to decide the issues presented in this case solely from the evidence admitted in 
open court and you are to apply to those facts the law given to you in these instructions. In this 
way, you decide the case, or, as we say, arrive at or reach a verdict. In deciding the case, you 
must follow my instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or 
what either side may state the law to be. 
The fact that the Defendant has been charged with an offense and brought before this 
Court for trial is not evidence of guilt, and raises no inference of guilt. 
In your deliberations, you must not be influenced by pity, sympathy, passion, prejudice, 
m o r ,  or by any previous information that you have heard or read. However, you are not 
required to set aside your general observations and experience in the affairs of life, but may 
consider evidence in light of such observations and experience. 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of any witness, that is, his or her tvorthiness of 
belief. In detemining such credibility, you may take into account the witness's memory, ability 
and opportunity to observe, manner of testifying, any motive, interest, bias, or prejudice such 
witness may have, the character of the witness's testimony and the reasonableness thereof, when 
considered in light of all the evidence in the case. You are also the judges of the weight to be 
given any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
You are being instnxcted as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach 
a verdict. Wether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of 
the facts. You will disregard any instruction that applies to a state of facts that you determine 
does not exist. 
You will notice that many, but not all, of these instructions that 1 am about to read to you 
are identical to those read to you at the beginning of the trial. It is not the intent of the Court to 
lay any special emphasis on those instructions. The only reason they are given to you again is so 
that all of the instructions concerning this case will be fresh in your minds and of equal 
importance when you start your deliberations. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
If during the trial I said or did anything that suggested to you that I was inclined to favor 
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such 
suggestion. I did not express, nor intend to express, nor did I intend to intimate, any opinion as 
to which witnesses were or were not worthy of belief"; what facts were or were not established; 
or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seemed to 
indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are the sole judges of what facts have or have not been proven. In determining the 
facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence consists of the 
sworn testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or 
admitted facts. Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
I .  Arguments and statements by the lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What 
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times are 
included to help you interpret the evidence, but are not evidence. If the facts as 
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow 
your memory; 
2. Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed 
to disregard; 
3. Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during the 
trial, an objection may have been made to a question asked of a witness, or to a witness's answer, 
or to an exhibit. This simply meant that I was being asked to decide a particular rule of law. 
Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be 
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustained an objection to a question or to an 
exhibit, the witness may not have answered the question or the exhibit may not have been 
considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might 
have shown. Similarly, if I told you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit, you should 
put it out of your mind and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
The law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of the facts, 
you must detemine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you 
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you 
attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in 
making these decisions are the considerations that you should apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses 
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each 
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say. 
NSTRUGTION NO. 5 
You are instructed that the State and the Defendant are entitled to the individual opinion 
of each juror. It is f ie  duty of each of you, after considering all the evidence in the case, to 
deternine, if possible, the question of the Defendant's guilt or imocence. When you have 
reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not change it merely because one or more or all 
of your fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion, or merely to bring about a 
unanimous verdict. However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss with his or her fellow 
jurors the evidence and the deductions to be drawn from it. After doing so, if any juror is 
satisfied that the conclusion first reached was wrong, that juror should unhesitatingly abandon 
the originaI opinion and render a verdict according to the final decision. 
NSTRUCTTION NO. 6 
In reaching your verdict in this action, you are to be guided and controlled only by the 
evidence adduced at this trial 'and the instructions now given to you by the Court. In case any of 
you have received information, or what purports to be information, from any other source other 
than the facts in this case, you are admonished and instructed to exclude such extraneous 
infomation or purported information from a11 consideration. Your verdict should be based 
exclusively upon the evidence offered at this trial and should in no way be influenced by any 
rumor, feeling, or outside influence coming from any quarter, either before or during this trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions conceming the law 
that applies to this case, the exhibits that were admitted into evidence, and any notes taken by 
you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testifj, is lefc to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of 
the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that a defendant 
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any 
way. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Under our law and system of justice, the Defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presmption of innocence means two things. 
First, the State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty. The State has that burden 
throughout the trial. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the 
Defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the State must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. It is the kind of doubt that mrould make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the most 
important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence, you have a 
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the Defendant, you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
You are hereby instructed that the Defendant, JAMES A. GOCETRAN, is charged with 
LEWD CONDUCT WITH A M N O R  W D E R  SIXTEEN YEARS, the charging portion of the 
Information reading: 
Defendant committed a lewd and lascivious act or acts upon or with the body of a 
rnirlor child under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: defendant had manual-genital 
contact with a child with initials A.J.H. birth date of 12/28/1992, with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lusts, passions or sexual desire of himself, 
or said minor, while at or near Kooskia, Idaho County, State of Idaho. in violation 
of I.C. 5 18-1 508. 
To the charge the Defendant pled "not guilty." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 1 
An Information is but a formal method of accusing a defendant of a crime. It is not 
evidence of any kind against the accused. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
You will notice that the Infomation charges that the offense was committed "on or 
about" a certain date. If the jury finds that the crime charged was committed, it is not necessary 
that the proof show that the crime was committed on that precise date. It is sufficient if the proof 
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged was committed "on or about" the date 
alleged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
It is not necessary that every fact and circumstance put in evidence on behalf of the State 
be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to sustain a conviction that all facts 
and circumstances in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
material elements of the offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A MINOR UNDER 
SIXTEEN YEARS, as charged in the Information, the State must prove each of the following: 
1) On or about March 30,2006, 
2) in the State of Idaho, 
3) the Defe~ldant, JAMES A. COCHRAN, committed an act of manual-genital 
contact upon or with the body of A.J.H. 
4) A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
5) The Defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or 
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the Defendant or of such child. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the Defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the Defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be touched. 
The touching may be through the clothing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
In these instructions, "sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and 
the actor, or between children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have 
self contact, any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some 
other person. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 7 
Tbe law does not require as an essential element of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a 
Child LTndcr Sixteen Years that the lust, passions, or sexual desires of either the Defendant or 
A.J.H. be actually aroused, appealed to, or gratified. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
The law permits the jury to find the Defendant guilty of any offense which is necessarily 
included in the crime of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS, as 
charged in the Information, whenever such a course is consistent with the facts found by the jury 
from the evidence in the case and with the law as given in the instructions of the Court. 
If the jury should unanimously find the Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct with a 
Child, then the jury must determine if the State has proven the Defendant committed the 
included offense of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD. In order to find the Defendant guilty of 
the included offense, you must be unanimous in your finding. 
The jury must bear in mind that the burden is always on the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt every essential element of an offense that is necessarily included in the crime 
charged. The law never imposes upon a Defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of 
calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
NSTRUCTION NO. 19 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Lewd Conduct with a 
Child Under Sixteen Years, as charged in the Information, you must acquit him of that charge. 
In that event, you must next consider the included offense of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD. 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, the State 
must prove each of the following: 
1) On or about March 30,2006, 
2) in the State of Idaho, 
3) the Defendant, James A. Cochran, caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H. not 
amounting to lewd conduct, 
4) the Defendant was eighteen (1 8) years of age or older, 
5 )  A.J.H. was under sixteen (1 6) years of age, and 
6) the Defendant did such act with the specific intent to gratify the lust, passions, or 
sexual desire of the Defendant or of such child. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the Defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the Defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen Years or the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child that A.J.H. may have consented to 
the alleged conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 1 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must 
not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the Defendant guilty, it will be my duty to 
determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some 
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few 
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you and then you will retire to the jury 
room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember the 
facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your decision on 
what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are important. It 
is rarefy productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of your opinion on the 
case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the beginning, your sense of pride 
may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your position even if shown that it is wrong. 
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can 
be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before making 
your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of the 
evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the law that 
relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations, each of you has a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest discussion 
that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw and heard during 
the trial and the.law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each 
of you must decide this case for yourself, but you should do so only after discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of 
evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels 
otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
lJpon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as the presiding juror who will direct 
your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that the issues 
submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a chance to 
express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. Your verdict cannot be arrived at by 
chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you. the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate with 
me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how the jury 
stands until you have reached a verdict, unless you are otherwise instructed by me to do so. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
In this case you will return a verdict consisting of a series of questions. Although the 
explanations on the verdict form are self-explanatory, they are part of my instructions to you. 
The verdict form states: 
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our 
verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCI-IJXAN, not guilty or 
guilty of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
If you found the Defendant not ~ui l ty ,  you should proceed to QUESTION NO. 2. 
If you found the Defendant guilty, you should sign and date the verdict form and 
notify the bailiff you are done. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCHRAN, not guilty or 
guilty of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
When all of you arrive at a verdict, the presiding juror will mark the appropriate verdict, 
sign and date the verdict form, and inform the bailiff you are done. You will then be returned 
into court where your presiding juror will, at my direction, hand the verdict form to the bailiff 
who will hand it to me. I will then direct the Clerk to read the verdict aloud and to record the 
verdict. Your presiding juror will be asked if this is your verdict and that juror will give your 
answer to the court. 
INSmUCTION NO. 25 
The State will now be given the opportunity to present summation to you. Following 
this, the defense will be afforded the opportunity to present summation. Then the State may 
present rebuttal argument. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ YERCE 
THE S'I'ATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE NO. CR06-32068 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
v. 1 VERDICT FORM 
1 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdict, 
unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCFIRAN, not guilty or guilty of 
LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
If you found the Defendant not guilty, you should proceed to QUESTION NO. 2. If you 
found the Defendant guilty, you should sign and date the verdict form and notify the bailiff you 
are done. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. C O C H U N ,  not guilty or guilty of 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
You should now sign and date the verdict form and notify the Bailiff you are done. 
Dated this day of May 2007 
Presiding Juror 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ldaho Attorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
,UAWO COUNTY DISTRICT C%URT 
. +-* FILED r 1 
JUSTIN D. WHATCOTT ISB #6444 ,'/I ./' 
Deputy Attorney General 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 83'720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR06-32068 
) 
) SENTENCING MEMORANDUM 
) 
) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submits this sentencing 
memorandum with regard to the sentencing in the above-entitled matter. Oral 
argument will be presented by the State at sentencing. 
FACTS 
The details of this case are more fully described in detail in the Pre- 
Sentence Report and the reports and attachments contained therein. Additionally, 
the State respecifully requests that the Court take Judicial Notice of the evidence 
and testimony presented at the jury trial in this matter from May 1 9  through the 
I s'h. 
On March 30'") 2006, thirteen year old Amanda Joy Hixon spent the night at 
the home of her best friend, thirteen year old Elizabeth "Chrissy" Cochran, in 
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Kooskia, Idaho. Both girls were on spring break at the time. Also at the house 
during this time period was Chrissy's mother, Doris Crocker-Wilson, and DorisJ 
live-in boyfriend, James Cochran, the Defendant in this case. The Defendant had 
recently adopted thirteen year old Chrissy, but was not married to Doris. 
On that evening, the Defendant took Chrissy and Amanda to the Sunset 
Mart in Kooskia, and purchased a six pack of "Mike's Cranberry LemonadeJ' and a 
four pack of "Seagram's Berry Wine Coolers." After making this purchase, the 
Defendant drove Chrissy and Amanda around the area in his vehicle while they 
drank the alcohol he had purchased for them. During the ride, he spoke with them 
about sex, talked about how he had not had sex for a long time, told Amanda that 
she could have "oral sex" without getting pregnant, and indicated that in his religion 
(The Pagan Religion), a person can have sex at any age if they feel emotionally 
ready. 
Later that evening after returning home, both Amanda Hixon and Chrissy 
Cochran got into bed to sleep with the Defendant. Chrissy immediately fell asleep 
due to the effects of the alcohol, and Amanda was forced to sleep in the middle 
between Chrissy and the Defendant. At some point during the night, the 
Defendant touched Amanda Hixon in a sexual and inappropriate manner on her 
body under her clothes. 
Approximately four weeks later, Amanda Hixon disclosed to a friend, and 
later to her mother, that the Defendant had touched her. This information was 
given to members of the ldaho County Sheriff's Office, who subsequently 
interviewed Amanda. After this interview, James Cochran was arrested on the 
charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. Later that day, Chrissy was interviewed by 
ldaho County Sheriff's Deputy Joan Renshaw at her school. Chrissy told Renshaw 
that she was unaware that the Defendant had touched Amanda because she was 
"passed out." Additionally, Chrissy indicated that the Defendant had touched her 
twice prior to the night that he touched Amanda. The first time was in February of 
2006 when the Defendant fondled her breasts under her bra, and the second time 
was on March 2gthJ 2006 when he touched ChrissyJs vaginal area with his hand. 
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The Defendant was charged with two counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor and was released on $30,000.00 bail. 
At the preliminary hearing on May 5'" 2006, Amanda Hixon testified to the actions 
of the Defendant on March 3oth, and he was bound over on one count of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor. Chrissy Cochran testified that the Defendant has never 
touched her, and thus the other two counts were dismissed. The Defendant was 
tried on one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor on May 15thJ 2007, and was 
convicted of the lesser-included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor on May 1 8thJ 
2007. 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS 
In addition to the criminal acts for which he has been convicted in the 
instant case, the Defendant has faced 7 prior allegations of sexual misconduct 
since 1991. The most recent of these allegations were made by his adopted 
daughter, Chrissy Cochran, in April of 2006. As noted above, Chrissy told 
Detective Joan Renshaw that the Defendant had fondled her breasts in February 
of 2006 and had touched her vagina in March of 2006. After Chrissy was 
questioned, her mother Doris indicated that she did not want Chrissy questioned 
further by law enforcement. Due to this lack of cooperation regarding her daughter 
as a sexual abuse victim, Chrissy was placed in emergency foster care. She was 
later returned to her mother's case and almost immediately recanted her 
allegations against the Defendant and indicated to law enforcement personnel that 
she would not testify that the Defendant had touched her. At the preliminary 
hearing, she simply indicated that he had never touched her inappropriately and 
no further inquiry was made. 
At trial, the Defendant offered the argument that Chrissy was pressured into 
making false allegations by Joan Renshaw, indicating that Renshaw had 
threatened Chrissy prior to interviewing her. The State intends to present the 
audio recording of this interview at the sente~cing to give the Court the opportunity 
to review the content and context of the interview to determine whether Chrissy 
appears to have been pressured or threatened into making any statements. The 
State submits that the evidence adduced at trial, as well as the circumstances 
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surrounding ChrissyJs recantation, support the position that the Defendant and 
Chrissy's smother are responsible for the pressure on Chrissy to make a false 
statement at the preliminary hearing. The Defendant had sufficient time prior to 
the preliminary hearing to place pressure on Chrissy, both directly and indirectly 
through her mother and other family members and friends. Additionally, Chrissy's 
mother, Doris Crocker-Wilson, stated to Skott Mealer that she had to "stay neutral 
in this thing," and that she had previously told Chrissy that "if Jamie goes to jail, 
we'll lose the house and four-wheelers." The influence of the Defendant and 
Chrissy's mother put sufficient pressure on a thirteen year old girl that she finally 
recanted the allegations against him. 
On October 3omJ 1999, the Defendant was accused by a co-worker in 
Worcester, Massachusetts of forcibly penetrating her vagina with his finger and 
forcing her to perform oral sex on him. The Defendant was charged with two 
counts of Rape for these actions, and denied that he had committed the offense. 
The Defendant claimed that the victim fabricated these allegations because she 
was late for work and because she had propositioned him sexually and he had 
declined her advances. The charges were eventually dismissed for unknown 
reasons. 
In August of 1994, the Defendant was discharged from the Army for the 
offense of "Indecent Acts upon a Child." The allegations leading to his "less than 
honorable dischargeJJ were that he touched the vaginal area of a five and a half 
year old female child. The Defendant claimed that he had simply put his hand in 
the child's diaper to check to see whether she needed to be changed. Army 
personnel found the allegations to be credible based upon the actions of the 
victim, her physical examination, and the statements of the Defendant. In the pre- 
sentence report, the Defendant claims that these allegations were dropped, and 
that he was discharged for striking a superior officer. The Army's detailed records 
regarding the lndecent Acts with a Child investigation reveal that the touching of 
the child was the basis for his discharge, and nowhere in any Army reports does it 
indicate that he was disciplined for striking an officer. 
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In July of 1991, the Defendant was alleged to have forced the wife of an 
Army enlistee to have oral sex with him in exchange for him not revealing her affair 
with another Army Sergeant. The woman alleged that she was forced to perform 
oral sex on the Defendant and that he fondled her vagina while she performed that 
act. The Defendant denied that this occurred, but was caught in several 
inconsistencies in his story. He was eventually found not guilty in a court martial 
proceeding. 
In analyzing the relevance of these prior acts, the State concedes that the 
Defendant has not been criminally convicted of these 7 allegations. However, 
these allegations are very relevant to the issue of the Defendant's character and 
whether he is an appropriate candidate for probation. The State submits that the 
Defendant has a history of sexual misconduct and inappropriate actions with 
females as evidenced by the following: 
1. The Defendant was alleged to have committed sexual misconduct twice 
---- *-- . - -we  -- 
while in-th th-on r e s u l t i n ~ e ~ s  than 
honorable discharge." The Defendant denies these two accusations and 
claims he was wrongfully accused. 
2. The Defendant was alleged to have committed a forcible sexual act upon a 
co-worker, and claimed that she fabricated these allegations due to him 
scolding her for being late and rejecting her sexual advances. 
3. The evidence at trial established that the Defendant has previously had very 
close relationships with young teenage girls. This was evidenced by the 
testimony of Amanda Hixon, Brianna Broncheau, and Amber Chamberlain 
indicating that each of these young teenage girls called the Defendant 
"Dad" or "UncleJ1 despite the fact that he was not biologically related to any 
of them. 
4. The Defendant's adopted daughter Chrissy alleged that he touched her 
inappropriately on two occasions. Although she later recanted this 
allegation after being exposed to the Defendant and other family members, 
she had no motivation to fabricate this allegation at the time it was made. 
Additionally, her allegation regarding his actions of touching her vagina on 
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March 29%) 2006 are substantially identical to the actions alleged by 
Amanda Hixon to have occurred on March 3othJ 2006. The Defendant 
claims that it was Joan Renshaw who pressured Chrissy into making a false 
statement, and that her recantation was the result of getting away from this 
pressure. 
5. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of his peers of committing the 
crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor against Amanda Hixon. The Defendant 
denies that this occurred and claims that Amanda Hixon is fabricating these 
allegations for unknown reasons. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to ldaho Code $1 8-1 506, the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child 
Under the Age of Sixteen Years carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment in the 
state prison for a period not to exceed twenty-five (25) years. Because no specific 
fine amount is indicated, the Defendant can be fined up to fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00) pursuant to ldaho Code 51 8-1 12. Furthermore, the Defendant can 
be order to pay restitution for any economic loss suffered by the victim pursuant to 
ldaho Code 51 9-5304. Additionally, ldaho Code 519-5307 provides that the Court 
may impose a fine not to exceed $5,000.00 against the Defendant, which shall 
operate as a civil judgment against the defendant, entered on behalf of the named 
victim. Also, ldaho Code 51 9-5506 mandates that the Defendant provide to the 
ldaho State Police a DNA sample and a right thumbprint impression. Finally, 
ldaho Code $1 8-8301, et. seq., require that the Defendant register as a sex 
offender upon release from incarceration. 
Under ldaho law, criminal sentencing is a two-part process. See State v. 
Reber, 138 ldaho 275,278, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct.App.2002). The sentencing court is 
first required to determine whether the defendant should be incarcerated or placed 
on probation under the criteria set forth in ldaho Code 51 9-2521. The decision 
regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is within the trial 
court's discretion. See Id. If the trial court determines that imprisonment is 
appropriate, then the trial court must determine the length of the sentence. See Id. 
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ldaho Code 519-2521 (1) provides that a sentencing court should deal with 
a defendant without imposing imprisonment unless, "having regard to the nature 
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the 
defendant," the court believes imprisonment is required for the protection of the 
public due to any one of the following factors: 
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or 
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided 
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime; 
0 r 
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the 
defendant; or 
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the 
community; or 
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal. 
Further, ldaho Code $1 9-2521 (2) lists grounds which shall be accorded weight in 
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. 
Additionally, the ldaho Supreme Court has listed four objectives of criminal 
punishment: (1) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and public 
generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. See State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1 978)) 
State v. Moore, 78 ldaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1 101, 1 103 (1 956). The Court of 
Appeals of ldaho has stated that a term of confinement is reasonable if it is 
necessary to accomplish these objectives. See State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 
568, 650 P.2d 707, 71 0 (Ct.App. 1982) 
1. The Defendant James A. Cochran i s  not an appropriate candidate for 
probation, and therefore should be sentenced to imprisonment. 
Under the criteria listed in ldaho Code $1 9-2521(1), the Defendant James A. 
Cochran is not an appropriate candidate for probation, and thus imprisonment is 
required in this case. Due to the Defendant's criminal actions in this case, as well 
as his history of allegations of sexual misconduct, there exists an undue risk that, if 
placed upon probation, he would commit another sexual crime. Additionally, 
because of his actions in this case and his history of sexual misconduct, the 
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Defendant is in need of correctional treatment in the form of a structured 
environment which prevents him from having access to young females. By his 
conviction in this case, the Defendant has become a convicted sex offender and 
certainly his history this status. As the Court in Toohill stated, the primary 
consideration in sentencing is the good order and protection of society. See 103 
ldaho at 568. In this case, the protection of society mandates that the public be 
protected from the Defendant's sexual acts and that he be incarcerated until he is 
no longer a threat to society. 
Furthermore, a sentence of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the 
Defendant's actions, which require a term of imprisonment for punishment and 
both specific and general deterrence. The jury found the Defendant guilty of 
touching a thirteen year old girl in an inappropriate and sexual manner. 
Additionally, the uncontested evidence at trial established that the Defendant gave 
the victim and his thirteen year old adopted daughter alcohol and spoke to them 
about sex before having them sleep in his bed. These facts indicate that the 
Defendant's actions that night were deliberate and planned. There is no evidence 
that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol or any type of controlled 
substance, or that he was an unwilling participant in these actions. Additionally, 
the victim was a person who was close with him, trusted him, and called him 
"Dad." The Defendant committed a violation of trust by taking advantage of a 
young girl that he got intoxicated in order to have the opportunity to feed his sexual 
deviance. As such, these egregious actions on the part of the Defendant warrant 
punishment. 
Additionally, because the Defendant committed a sexual act with a thirteen 
year old girl, the sentence in this case must be one which will deter the Defendant 
and the public in general from committing such an act. Certainly the State has an 
interest in protecting children from sexual predators and individuals who would 
commit the type of acts that James Cochran has been found guilty of committing. 
Due to the prevalence of high-profile child sexual abuse cases in recent years, the 
importance and effect of deterrence in sentencing has become paramount. This is 
reflected by the fact that in 2006, the ldaho Legislature amended Idaho Code $1 8- 
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1506 to increase the maximum penalty from fifteen (15) years to twenty-five (25) 
years. A sentence that does not impose imprisonment would depreciate the 
Defendant's conduct and eliminate the effect of deterrence contemplated by the 
ldaho Legislature and ldaho Courts. The sentence in this case should send the 
message to the Defendant and the public in general that individuals who commit 
sexual acts with young children will be severely punished with imprisonment. 
Further, the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate for probation due to his 
history of sexual offenses. Although this is his first criminal conviction, the 
allegations of "Indecent Liberties with a Child in 1994 were deemed credible by 
the Army and led to a "Less than Honorable" discharge of the Defendant from the 
Army. Additionally, the allegations made by his adopted daughter Chrissy were 
recanted only after she was influenced by the Defendant and her mother. The 
Court can listen to that audio tape at the sentencing hearing and determine 
whether the allegations seem credible or not. It is also noteworthy that in each 
allegation of sexual misconduct (including the instant offense), the Defendant 
claims that he was wrongfully accused and lays blame on the victim, yet admits to 
circumstances that place him in a situation where he had the opportunity to commit 
the offense with no other witnesses present (e.g. admitting to purchasing alcohol 
for Amanda Hixon and Chrissy Cochran and having them in his bed, admitting to 
giving the alleged rape victim in 1991 in Massachusetts a "back rub," admitting to 
"checking the diaper" of the alleged victim in 1994, and admitting to being alone 
with the alleged victim in 1991 and possibly leaving a pubic hair in his patrol 
vehicle). These circumstances lead to the conclusion that either the Defendant is 
the most unlucky person in the world with numerous people "out to get him," or he 
has repeatedly committed sexual offenses without being held accountable or 
having been punished. 
ldaho Code $1 9-2521 (2) lists the criteria that may be considered as grounds in 
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. These mitigating factors weigh 
against the Defendant in this case as follows: 
(a) The Defendant's criminal conduct caused harm to Amanda Hixon and her 
family; 
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM (COCHRAN), Page 9 
i";'" 
CC 
i '  s 64 
(b) The Defendant knew andlor should have known that his conduct would 
cause harm to Amanda Hixon; 
(c) The Defendant acted under no provocation; 
(d) Nothing established in the evidence in this case excuses or justifies the 
Defendants actions in any way; 
(e) The victim did nothing to induce or facilitate the commission of the crime; 
(f) The Defendant cannot compensate the victim for the emotional harm that 
he has caused her, and that emotional harm will likely effect her for her 
entire life; 
(g) The Defendant has a history of prior sexual misconduct, as detailed above; 
(h) The Defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances that are likely to 
recur due to the fact that he has numerous close relationships with young 
teenage girls; 
(i) The character and attitude of the Defendant in denying that this act ever 
occurred indicates that the commission of another crime is m. 
Under the criteria in ldaho Code $1 9-2521 (1) and (2), the Court should deal with 
this Defendant, for committing this crime, by imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 
Finally, the State submits that the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate 
for probation due to his actions during the course of the proceedings in this case. 
The Defendant has made numerous attempts to manipulate potential witnesses in 
this case, and has repeatedly disparaged and harassed State's witnesses. 
Examples of the Defendant's manipulation can be found in the testimony of 
Chrissy Cochran, Brianna Broncheau, and Amber Chamberlain, as well as the 
statements of Saundra Barrett and Fred Hendren. Furthermore, the Defendant 
prior to trial complained to school officials in Kooskia that Amanda Hixon should 
not be attending school in Kooskia because she commonly stayed at her 
grandmother's house in Kamiah, and because he would not be able to go to the 
school due to the no-contact order. These actions of the Defendant, as well as the 
frequent harassment by the Defendant's adopted daughter and her friends, 
caused the victim in this case to move out of state. Additionally, the Defendant 
has made numerous public accusations of impropriety against ldaho County 
Sheriff's Detectives Skott Mealer and Joan Renshaw, and has actually filed a 
"Notice of Tort Claim" against them. 
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2. The Court should impose a term of imprisonment that effectuates the 
goals of ( I )  protection of society, (2) deterrence, (3) rehabilitation, and 
14) punishment. 
The ldaho Court of Appeals has stated that the goal of protection of society is 
the primary consideration in sentencing as a matter of policy. See Toohill, 103 
ldaho at 568, citing Moore, 78 ldaho at 363. As detailed above, the protection of 
society in this case requires that the Defendant be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for his crime. Furthermore, a sentence of imprisonment will 
effectuate the goal of deterrence, both for this specific Defendant and for society in 
general. Because of the nature of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, and the 
desire to protect children from sexual predators, deterrence is an important 
consideration for the Court in fashioning a sentence in this case. The term of 
imprisonment should reflect the seriousness of the Defendant's actions and 
discourage him and others from sexually abusing children. 
In addition, the goals of punishment and rehabilitation are very important 
considerations for a Court that is fashioning a sentence for a Defendant convicted 
of a sex offense against a child. Certainly this type of deviant act warrants a 
significant punishment as retribution for a crime that our society deems to be one 
of the most despicable and deviant acts a person can commit. Additionally, 
because it is commonly recognized that individuals who commit sexual acts 
against children need sex offender treatment, the question of whether a defendant 
can be rehabilitated, and how he can be rehabilitated is important in determining 
an appropriate sentence. 
In the present case, the Defendant refuses to acknowledge that he committed 
this act, just as he has denied that he committed any of the previous allegations 
against him. It is clear from the Defendant's attitude regarding the factual 
allegations upon which he was convicted, as well as his history of sexual 
misconduct, that without some type of treatment or rehabilitation, he is likely to 
face such "allegations" again in the future. The ldaho Court of Appeals has 
repeatedly stated that it is appropriate for a Court to consider a defendant's refusal 
to admit guilt in child sex cases as a factor in sentencing as it relates to the 
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possibility of rehabilitation. State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 355, 883 P.2d 
704, 71 3 (Ct.App.1994) (defendant's minimization of his culpability with respect to 
the commission of a lewd and lascivious act with his young daughter, following a 
jury conviction for the same, was a proper sentencing consideration); State v. 
Lawrence, 1 12 Idaho 149, 157-58, 730 P.2d 1069, 1077-78 (Ct.App. 1986) 
(defendant's refusal to admit guilt following a jury conviction for lewd and lascivious 
conduct with minors is a relevant sentencing consideration insofar as rehabilitation 
is concerned). 
Additionally, "many courts have held that an acknowledgement of guilt is a 
critical first step toward rehabilitation." 4. at 157, citing United States v. Hull, 792 
F.2d 941 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1069, 95 S.Ct. 654, 42 L.Ed.2d 664 (1974); Goilaher v. United 
States, 41 9 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 
L.Ed.2d 424 (1969). Because the Defendant refuses to acknowledge that he did 
anything wrong other than purchase alcohol for two thirteen year old girls (he 
claims he did this after they "repeatedly" asked him to), he cannot make this first 
step towards rehabilitation. Only in a structured environment with extensive 
treatment will the Defendant finally be able to take accountability and responsibility 
for his actions, and admit his wrongdoing. Absent placement in a structured 
environment with treatment, the Defendant will not be able to effectuate 
rehabilitation such that he will no longer be a threat to society. 
The State submits that the four goals of sentencing analyzed above will be 
adequately addressed, with specific emphasis on protection of society, by a 
sentence of Fifteen (15) years incarceration, with Five (5) years fixed and Ten 
(10) years indeterminate. Such a sentence will ensure that society is protected 
from the Defendant until such time that the Department of Corrections can 
evaluate him, subject him to rehabilitative treatment, and then determine whether 
he is no longer a threat to society such that he can be placed on parole. 
Additionally, a period of fifteen years is a sufficient length of imprisonment such 
that the goals of punishment and deterrence for this Defendant, as well as 
deterrence to society in general, will be met. Finally, the existence of a ten year 
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"tail," or indeterminate time, on the sentence will allow the Defendant the 
opportunity for parole after a relatively short period of imprisonment, while also 
providing for an extended period of supervision. 
The State further requests that the Court additionally sentence the Defendant 
to a fine in an amount reflecting the seriousness of the offense, and to order the 
requirements of immediate fingerprinting, an immediate DNA sample, and 
registration on the Sexual Offender Registry, as provided by statute. Finally, 
the victim is not requesting a specific amount of restitution due to the fact that she 
has not yet attended counseling for the Defendant's actions, but her parents have 
indicated that they wish to obtain counseling for her. As such, the State 
respectfuily requests this Court enter an order under ldaho Code 31 9-5307 that 
the Defendant is fined the amount of $5,000.00, and that such fine shall 
operate as a civil judgment in the name sf Amanda Hixon. The State 
specifically requests that the order specify that the Defendant is to pay that fine to 
Amanda Hixon. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has been found guilty by an ldaho County Jury of 
committing the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16 Years of Age for 
sexually touching Amanda Hixon. Additionally, the Defendant has a history of 
being accused of sexual misconduct dating back to 1991. Under the criteria listed 
in ldaho Code $1 9-2521, the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate for 
probation, and thus should be sentenced to a period of incarceration in the State 
penitentiary. The period of imprisonment should reflect the seriousness of his 
crime and accomplish the goals of protection of society, deterrence, punishment, 
and rehabilitation. Therefore, the State respectfully requests the Court impose the 
following sentence: 
1) A period of incarceration in the State penitentiary of Fifteen (15) Years, with 
Five (5) Years determinate and Ten (10) Years indeterminate 
2) A Fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), with Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) suspended. 
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3) That the Defendant be required to provide the ldaho State Police with a 
fingerprint sample pursuant to ldaho Code $1 8-8306(1) and a DNA sample 
pursuant to ldaho Code $1 9-5506 immediately upon his incarceration. 
4) That the Defendant be required to register pursuant to the Sexual Offender 
Registration Act, ldaho Code $1 8-8306, et. seq. 
5) That the Defendant be fined an amount of Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00), and that the fine be payable to Amanda Hixon, and that the 
fine shall serve as a civil judgment against the Defendant entered on the 
behalf of Amanda Hixon. 
DATED this @day of August, 2007. 
eputy ttorney General u 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @ day of August 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum to: 
Danny J. Radakovich 
1624 G. Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
F a  (208) 746-4672 
X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid - 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- Facsimile 
#osean Newman, Legal Secretary 
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Danny J .  Radakovicli 
Radakovich Law Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
1624 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 746-8 162 
Idaho State Bar #I 991 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 1 CASE NO. CR 2006-32068 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF POST 
1 TRIAL MOTIONS 
v. 1 
1 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
THE DEFENDANT has filed two post-trial motions in this niatter. One is a motion for a 
new trial and the other is a renewal of his previously made motion for ajudgement of acquittal. The 
purpose of this brief is to set forth the position of the defendant on those motions. Counsel for the 
defendant has only just, on August 24, 2007, received the partial transcript which is necessary to 
prosecute the motion for new trial and there will be reference to that transcript in this brief. 
The motion for a new trial is based upon Rule 34, I.R.C.P., and upon Idaho Code 5 19-2406. 
The grounds for new trial are generally set forth in the statutory section and the ones which 
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may apply in this case are: 
"5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the court of a trial. 
6. When the verdict is contrary to the law or the evidence." 
A motion for a judgement of acquittal 1s governed by Rule 20, I.R.C.P., and si~o~ild be
granted if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the offense charged in the 
indictment, information, or complaint. The rule goes on the say that, if a motion for a verdict of 
acquittal is made and the court reserves ruling on the motion and submits the matter to the jury, then 
the court may grant the motion even after the jury returns a verdict of guilty. 
As the court is aware, the defendant was actually charged with the offense of lewd conduct 
with a minor under the age of sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code tj 18- 1508. That statute provides, 
in relevant part, as follo\vs: 
"Any person who shall commit and lewd of lascivious act or acts upon or 
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of sixteen 
(16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contract, oral-genital contact, 
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual anal contact, or manual-genital 
contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, . . . when any of such 
acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust of 
passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor child, or third parties, shall be 
guilty of a felony. . ." 
The court elected, on its own initiative, to instruct the jury not only on the charge of lewd conduct, 
but also on the potentially lesser included offense of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen 
(1 6) years. That offense is set forth in Idaho Code $1 8-1506, which provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
"(1 )  It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, with the 
intent to gatify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor child or third 
party, to: 
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(b) cause of have sexual contact with such minor child not 
amounting to lewd conduct as defined in section 18-1508, ldaho 
Code: 
(3) For the purposes of this section "sexual contact" means any physical 
contact between such minor child and any person, which is caused by the actor, or 
the actor causing such minor child to have self contact." 
The defendant was found not guilty of the charge of lewd conduct but found guilty of the charge of 
sexual abuse, which is problematic, based on the evidence in this case. We have the following 
arguments. 
1 .  INSTRUCTING ON SEXUAL ABUSE WAS ERROR. 
A. THE ACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DID NOT 
SUPPORT AN INSTRUCTION ON SEXUAL ABUSE. 
As noted above, the instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse was given on 
the court's initiative and not at the request of the defendant. While it is true that sexual abuse g a ~  
be a lesser included offense of lewd conduct, that may not necessarily be so in every case. State v. 
Drennon. 126 Idaho 346,353,883 P.2d 704 (Ct. .4pp., 1994) It I S  the facts alleged whlch dete~ I ~ I I I C  
the propriety of illstructing on sexual abuse as a lesser included offense. State v. O'Neill, 1 18 ldaho 
244, 249, 796 P.2d 12 1 (1990) 
In this particular case, it is clear that the information filed against the defendant only alleged 
manual-genital contact between the defendant and Amanda Wixon. Therefore, the only relevant 
evidence in the case was evidence of manual-genital contact and the vast majorit\/ o f  the t e s t ~ ~ i ~ o ~ i \  
of Amanda Wixon dealt with that in great detail. There was a brief portion of Amanda HIXOII'S 
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testimony relative to touching upon the breast (Tr. P. 29, 11. 6-1 8) but the State never made any 
motion to anend the information to contain those iBctu;il allegations and, therefore, any testimony 
as to the touching of the breast was mere surplusage, as the charge sat at the time of trial. 
It is very clear from the face of Idaho Code $18-1 508 that the alleged manual-genital 
touching, as alleged in the information, if proven, would amount to lewd conduct. The decision in 
Drennon, supra, is quite clear on the point that, when the evidence shows orrly lewd conduct, it is 
not appropriate to instruct on the lesser ~ncluded offense of sexual abuse Thus, the test1111o11\ 'tt tlic 
trial should have been limited to manual-genital contact and there should have been no ~nstr-uct~on 
on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse on a minor. For that reason, the defendant is entitled 
to a new trial. 
B. GIVING AN INSTRUCTION ON THE 1,ESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF SEXUAL ABUSE, IN THE ABSENCE OF '4 REQUEST FOR 
SAID INSTRUCTION BY EITHER PARTY, \$/AS INCORRECT. 
A second aspect as to the propriety ofthe court g~ving the lesser ~ncludecl offense ~ n s t r u c t ~ o ~ ~  
on the charge of sexual abuse resolves around Idaho Code 9 19-2 132, the statute governing the giving 
ofjury instructions in criminal cases. That statutory section provides, in relevant part, as follo\vs: 
"(b) The court shall instruct the jury with respect to a lesser included offense 
if:  
(1) Either party requests such an instruction; a 
(2) There is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that 
would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense 
but did not commit the greater offense." (Emphasis ours) 
This version of the statute in question, which was the version in effect at the time of this trial, 
incorporates a change in the law requiring that the lesser included offense instruction be given only 
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if requested by either party. In other words, after this amendment, it would no longer bo proper for 
the court to givc such an instruction suu sponte. 
It is true that, prior to 1988, there were numerous cases which discrrssctl this issue, 
emphasizing that i t  was the trial court's duty to give instructio~~s on lesser included o f i l ~ s e s  As 1 5  
noted in thc Drenaon, supra, case in footnote 1 on page 352 of the decision, however, the 
amendment to Idaho Code $19-2 132 effectively changed all of that and placed the affirmative duty 
on the parties to request the lesser included offense instruction. 
Given that neither party appears to have requested the instruction on the lesser included 
offense of sexual abuse of a minor, it was incorrect under Idalio Code 8 19-2 132 to give S L I C I I  an 
instruction and the defendant should receive a new trial on that ground as well. 
2. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISH LEWD 
CONDUCT AND SEXUAL ABUSE. 
A further point to consider is that the instructions given really did not distinguish between 
the charge of lewd conduct and the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in any meaningful and 
intelligible fashion. The problem lies with the fashion in which the legislature chose to draft these 
two (2) statutory section, i.e., Idaho Code $318-1506 and 18- 1508. That fact is recognized in the 
Drennon, supra, case wherein the court noted at page 354 thereof as follows: 
"Unfortunately, I.C. $18- 1506 and $18- 1508 are poorly written and appear 
to prohibit overlapping kinds of conduct. Sexual conduct that amounts to sexual 
abuse can conceivably fall into the nebulous category of acts which, under I.C. $1 8- 
1508, included but are not limited to the enumerated acts of lewd conduct." 
Tlie difficulty with the situation in this case lies in the fact that the defendant was acquitted of the 
greater charge but convicted of the lesser charge. Had he been convicted of the greater charge, there 
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can't hc too much doubt that the jury was properly tnstsucteci or1 the elerr~ents of the of fensc \,$'I tli 
respect to the lesser charge of sexual abuse, the only definition given to the jury, which admittedly 
mirrors the statute, is that the defendant engaged in sexual contact not amount to lewd conduct. 
Thus, the jury really had no definition of what that might be and the defendant certainly should have 
been entitled to have them know more than they were told. Thc key to the problem rnay well be that 
Idaho Code 6 18- 1506 of unconstitutionally vague 
In the absence of some better definition of "sexual abuse", the defendant should have a new 
trial on that charge. 
3. THE VAIRLANCE IN EVIDENCE FROM WHAT WAS CHARGE IN THE 
INFORMATION REOUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
In the case before the court, as noted above, the information brought against the defendant 
in this case charges only the crime of lewd conduct based on manual-genital contact between the 
defendant and the alleged victim. During the trial, however, the prosecution went beyond the 
information and adduced testimony as to other types of conduct, to which the alleged victim 
indicated that her breast had been touched. Perhaps this is the basis for the jury's conviction on the 
charge of sexual abuse. There is no way to know. It is clear in the law that, since manual-genital 
contact purely falls within the definition of lewd conduct, the finding of "not guilty" on the lewd 
conduct charge amounts to a finding by the jury that manual-genital contact did not occur. That 
leaves only the alleged touching of the breast. The law would seem to say that, since the evidence 
of the alleged touching of the breast was different that the actions charged in the information, the 
State may only properly proceed on that evidence if it is a "mere variance" from the language o f  the 
information. 
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The case of State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,565,861 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App., 1993) notes thc 
following: 
""Generally, a variance behveen the facts alleged in the pleading instrument 
and the proof at trial will not be deemed fatal unless there has been such a variance 
as to 'affect the substantial rights of the accused.' (Citations omitted) a 'mere 
variance' between t11e facts alleged in the infonnation and those proved at trial 
requires reversal of the convictiort only when an examination of the record indicates 
that the defendant was deprive of a right to fair notice or is left open to the risk of 
double jeopardy. 
However, there is a marked difference between a 'mere variance' and a 
variance which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an impermissible 
konstructive amendment'. (Citations omitted) Although the rules for amertdlng an 
information in this state arc liberal, see I.C. jj 19- 1420, any amendment which charges 
the accused with a crime of greater degree or u dffererzt nature than that for which 
the accused was bound over for trial by the committing magistrate is barred by the 
Idaho Constitution. (Citations omitted) Where a variance alters the Information to the 
extent that an amendment of the same scope would be prohibited, the failure to hold 
the variance fatal would necessarily undermine these statutory and constitutional 
limitations placed on amendments. 
In this case, we conclude that the district court's instructions went beyond 
creating a "mere variance" between the conduct alleged in the Information and the 
conduct proved at trial; it amounted to a constructive amendment of the lnfonrratlon 
to charge Colwell with additional crimes that were separate and distrnct ti-om the 
crime explicitly alleged. Such an amelldment clearly is barred by this state's 
constitution, and constitutes reversible error." 
The State may well argue that the instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse was a 
Cb 
mere variance", since sexual abuse is a lesser included offense of lewd conduct but that would be 
incorrect. In the Colwell, supra, case outlined above, the defendant was, just as in the instant case, 
charged with lewd conduct, although his alleged lewd act was gen~tal-gen~tal contact ~11it1 101 
manual-genital contact, as alleged in the instant case. In the Colwell, supra, case, the trial court 
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse and the defendant was found guilty 
of that lesser offense. The situation in the Colwell, supra, case was one where the prosecutor chose 
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to charge the defendant with a single act of lewd conduct based upon a single specified act of genital- 
to-genital conduct and then other information beyond that was adduced at trial, much as was the case 
here. The present case pretty much perfectly parallels Colwell, supra, case and the court should set 
aside the verdict in this case as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Wether the court \vould elect to enter a judgement of acquittal or to order a new tr~al,  ~t 
seems clear, for the reasons set forth above, that the defendant's conviction of the charge of sexual 
abuse was not proper. It c a p o t  stand. 
day of August, 2007. 
I hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was 
faxed to: 1 i 
Justin D. liVhutcott 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83 720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR06-32068 
) 
VS. ) STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO 
JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) ANEWTRIAL 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submits this memorandum in 
opposition to the Defendant's motion for a new trial. The State respectfully 
requests the Court deny the Defendant's motion. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 8, 2006, the Defendant was charged by Information in the District 
Court of ldaho County with one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor in violation of 
ldaho Code §18-1508. After several continuances of the trial date, the trial was 
scheduled for March 5, 2007. On February 14, 2007 the State submitted to the 
Court and to the Defendant a copy of the "State's Requested Jury Instructions." 
(See Exhibit A). On February 21, 2007, the jury trial in this matter was continued 
to May 15, 2007 due to the Defendant hiring new counsel. On May 1 I, 2007 the 
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Court provided the State and Defense counsel a copy of the Court's draft jury 
instructions. Both the requested instructions filed by the State and the Court's 
draft instructions gave the jury the option to find the Defendant guilty of the 
included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16. At no time prior to trial did 
the Defendant object to any of the jury instructions proposed by the Court or the 
State. 
On May 15, 2007, the jury trial was held in this matter. All of the evidence 
was fully submitted to the jury on May 17, 2007. The jury instruction conference 
was held on the morning of May 18, 2007 prior to closing arguments, where the 
State indicated that it did not object to the Court's proposed instructions. Defense 
counsel then made the statement that "I do not believe that the instructions are 
inaccurate on the law," but then proceeded to submit an objection to the use of 
ICJl 103A instead of lCJl 103, as the definition of reasonable doubt. The Court 
overruled this objection and gave lCJl 103A as the instruction on reasonable 
doubt. 
At no time during the jury instruction conference did the Defendant indicate 
that he objected to the inclusion of the instructions on the lesser included offense 
of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, or that he thought those instructions did not accurately 
reflect the applicable law. Prior to closing arguments, the Court read all of the 
proposed instructions to the jury, which included instructions on the jury's option to 
convict the Defendant of the included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor under 
Age 16. 
Approximately four hours into jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the 
court asking "What happens if we can't reach a unanimous verdict?" The Court 
instructed the jury that it could give them no further instructions other than the ones 
already provided. Approximately twenty minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of 
Not Guilty on the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, and Guilty of Sexual 
Abuse of a Minor Under 16. The Defendant has filed a motion seeking a new trial. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
1. Under ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the Defendant is prevented from 
asserting error in the iuw instructions due to his failure to object 
thereto prior to the jury retiring to consider its verdict. 
The Defendant's asserts as his primary assignment of error the Court's 
instructions giving the jury the option to convict the Defendant of the included 
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16 in the event it acquitted the 
Defendant of the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. The Defendant asserts a 
variety of legal theories in claiming that the giving of these instructions by the Court 
constitutes error requiring a new trial. However, the Defendant fails to recognize 
that he has waived any challenge to these jury instructions due to his failure to 
object to them prior to jury deliberations. ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) states: 
... No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party 
objects and the grounds of the objection. 
This rule makes it clear that if a party fails to object to a jury instruction prior 
to the jury deliberations, that party may not assign as error the giving of that jury 
instruction. In this case, the Defendant failed to object to the jury instructions on 
Sexual Abuse of a Minor, despite the fact that he was given notice of the State's 
request three months prior to trial, was given notice of the Court's intent to give the 
instructions prior to trial, and was given one more opportunity to object at the jury 
instruction conference. By indicating on the record that he believed the 
instructions were accurate on the law, the Defendant stipulated to the giving of the 
instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor. The Defendant's decision to stipulate to 
the instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor prevents him from asserting the giving 
of that instruction as error and grounds for a new trial under I.C.R. 30(b). In the 
event that the Defendant attempts to argue that counsel's failure to object to the 
instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel, it is clear that under ldaho Code §19-2406, ineffective assistance of 
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counsel is not a valid ground for a motion for a new trial. See State v. Roberts, 
129 Idaho 194,923 P.2d 439 (1996). 
To allow the Defendant to now assert error in the giving of an instruction 
that he stipulated to would be in direct conflict with I.C.R. 30(b), and would invite 
criminal Defendants to inject error into proceedings in order to preserve their right 
to obtain a new trial in the event of conviction. Additionally, allowing the Defendant 
to challenge these instructions, despite his failure to object, would create extreme 
prejudice to the State by eliminating any opportunity to cure any error in the 
instructions by amending the charging language or proposing alternative 
instructions prior to jury deliberations. Finally, under the circumstances of this 
case, in the event that the jury was not instructed on Sexual Abuse of a Minor 
Under 16, the State submits that the Defendant would not have been acquitted of 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor. 
Additionally, the Defendant has cited to State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 560, 
861 P.2d 1225 (Ct.App.1993) as authority for his motion for a new trial. However, 
in Colwell, the Defendant objected to the giving of instructions on the included 
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. Further, the Court exercised "free review" of 
the jury instructions, as that was the applicable legal standard at the time. Prior to 
2004, the failure to object to a jury instruction did not constitute a waiver of any 
objection to the instruction on appeal. However, since the decision in Colwell, The 
ldaho Supreme Court passed ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), effective July 1, 2004, 
which prevents a criminal defendant from asserting error in a jury instruction unless 
such instruction was objected to prior to the jury's deliberations. This change has 
been recognized by the ldaho Court of Appeals. See State v. Lilly, 142 ldaho 70, 
71, 122 P.3d 1170, 1171 (Ct.App.2005), State v. Anderson, 2006 WL 2974049 
(Ct.App.2006). 
Pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the State respectfully requests that 
the Court refuse to consider the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial to the extent it 
relies on the challenge of the Court's instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
The Defendant was given three months to object to the request for the instructions 
on the included offense and chose not to do so. Further, Defense counsel 
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indicated on the record that the instructions were accurate statements of the 
applicable law. As such, the Defendant has stipulated to the giving of those 
instructions and has waived the right to assert error in those instructions under 
I.C.R. 30(b). 
2. The Court correctly instructed the jury on the included offense of 
Sexual Abuse of a Minor because it was requested by the State, 
stipulated to by the Defendant, and a reasonable view of the evidence 
supported a find in^ that the Defendant committed the crime of Sexual 
Abuse of a Minor. 
An offense may be deemed an included offense if the evidence adduced at trial 
proves that such an offense was committed during the commission of the charged 
offense. See State V. Bolton, 119 ldaho 846, 81 0 P.2d 1132 (Ct.App.1991). ldaho 
Code §19-2132(b) provides that the Court shall instruct on a lesser-included 
offense if: 
(1) Either party requests such an instruction; and 
(2) There is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that 
would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included 
offense but did not commit the greater offense. 
In this case, the State requested that the lesser included offense be given, as 
evidenced by Exhibit A. Further, a reasonable view of the evidence presented 
a trial could support a finding that the defendant committed the offense of 
Sexual Abuse of a Minor, but not the offense of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct. 
At trial, Amanda Hixon testified that while she was in bed with the 
Defendant on March 3oth, 2006, the Defendant touched her breast area with 
his hand, and that he subsequently placed his fingers inside her vagina, 
pushing them in and out. To rebut her claim, the Defendant presented 
evidence by way of stipulation to show that the sheets on the Defendant's bed 
were tested for DNA, and that none of Amanda Hixon's DNA was found on the 
sheets. During opening and closing arguments, Defense counsel pointed out 
that the lack of DNA, as well as the lack of any corroborating medical 
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evidence, was grounds for the jury to disbelieve Amanda Hixon's testimony 
regarding the alleged manual to genital contact. 
However, no evidence presented during the trial contradicted Amanda 
Hixon's testimony regarding the Defendant touching her breasts. In fact, the 
Defendant's own evidence presented in the form of the testimony of Doris 
Crocker, indicated that Amanda Hixon was in the bedroom with the Defendant, 
and that the Defendant had his hands upon Amanda's body. Although 
Crocker claimed that this occurred because Amanda was "sleepwalking" and 
had fallen on the Defendant while he was in bed, her own testimony 
established that there was a short period of time that Amanda Hixon was in 
the bedroom with the Defendant before Crocker got there. 
Additionally, the testimony of Amanda Hixon was significantly 
corroborated by the testimony of Chrissy Cochran and her prior statements. 
Chrissy had previously indicated to Joan Renshaw that both she and Amanda 
had gone to sleep with the Defendant in his bed, and that she had passed out 
and "had no idea" what had happened between the Defendant and Amanda. 
Chrissy admitted making these statements approximately three weeks after 
the evening that this incident occurred. Further, the testimony of Chrissy 
Cochran significantly corroborated Amanda Hixon's testimony regarding the 
events leading up to the sexual contact that evening and Amanda Hixon's 
actions subsequent to the sexual contact. Finally, Chrissy Cochran's 
testimony further corroborated Amanda Hixon's testimony by establishing that 
she was in the bedroom with the Defendant and the Defendant had his hands 
upon her. 
Under the facts presented at trial, a reasonable view of the evidence 
could support the assertion that the Defendant touched Amanda Hixon's 
breasts (acts constituting Sexual Abuse of a Minor), but did not have manual 
to genital contact with her (acts constituting Lewd Conduct with a Minor). 
Although the State submits that the evidence established both actions 
occurred, the aforementioned view of the evidence is reasonable given the 
lack of corroboration regarding the acts constituting Lewd Conduct, the 
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significant corroboration of the rest of Amanda Hixon's story, and the lack of 
contradicting evidence regarding the acts constituting Sexual Abuse. 
Therefore, under ldaho Code 919-2132, it was appropriate for the Court to 
instruct on the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. Even assuming that ldaho 
Criminal Rule 30(b) did not prevent the Defendant's challenge to these 
instructions, or assuming that the Defendant had objected to these 
instructions, the Court was nonetheless correct to instruct on the included 
offense based upon the evidence adduced at trial. As such, the Defendant's 
claims that providing these instructions constitute grounds for a new trial are 
without merit, and the Court should reject such argument and deny the 
Defendant's motion. 
3. The Court correctly instructed the iurv on the difference between 
Lewd Conduct and Sexual Abuse 
The Defendant claims that the Court did not adequately distinguish between 
Lewd Conduct and Sexual abuse in its instructions. As stated above, ldaho 
Criminal Rule 30(b) prevents the Defendant from asserting as error a jury 
instruction that he failed to object to prior to jury deliberations. As such, the 
Defendant cannot now assert error in the jury instructions as grounds for his 
motion for a new trial. 
Even assuming that the Defendant could challenge the jury instructions, or had 
objected to the instructions regarding Sexual Abuse of a Minor, the instructions 
adequately defined both offenses in light of the evidence presented at trial. During 
the jury trial, Amanda Hixon testified that the Defendant touched her on her 
breasts and that he had manual-genital contact with her. The jury instructions 
listed the elements of both Lewd Conduct with a Minor and Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor consistent with the statutory language and the ldaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions. The elements instruction on Sexual Abuse of a Minor defines the act 
as "caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H., not amounting to lewd conduct." 
Further, "sexual contact" was defined by a jury instruction stating: 
"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the 
actor, or between children which is caused by the actor, or the actor 
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causing the child to have self-contact, any of which is intended to gratify 
the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other person. 
The effect of these jury instructions, coupled with the evidence presented at 
trial, was that the jury was instructed to consider whether the Defendant committed 
an act of manual to genital contact. If they determined that he did not commit that 
offense, they could then determine if he had sexual contact with Amanda Hixon, 
not amounting to lewd conduct. The evidence presented supported the allegation 
that the Defendant had manual contact with Amanda Hixon's breasts, with the 
intent to sexually gratify himself or his victim. This action constitutes Sexual Abuse 
of a Minor under the statutory language and under the language of the jury 
instructions. Additionally, because there was no other evidence indicating that the 
Defendant committed other types of lewd conduct (such as genital to genital or 
oral to genital contact), or any other types of sexual contact, there was no danger 
that the jury would be confused about what actions the Defendant could be 
convicted for. Therefore, the jury instructions provided in this case correctly and 
adequately defined which action constituted Lewd Conduct, and which action 
constituted Sexual Abuse. There is no danger of jury confusion in the application 
of these instructions to the evidence presented. To the extent that the Defendant 
wants to argue that the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor under ldaho Code $18- 
1506 is unconstitutionally vague, no ldaho Court has ever held such. 
Under the facts in this case, the jury was given the option to either (I) find that 
the Defendant committed an act of manual to genital contact, and if not, then (2) to 
find that the Defendant committed an act of sexual contact not amount to Lewd 
Conduct, or (3) find that the Defendant did not commit either sexual acts. What is 
readily apparent from the verdict is that the jury did find that the Defendant 
committed an act of sexual contact, not amounting to lewd conduct, with the intent 
to arouse, appeal to, or gratify his own or Amanda Hixon's lusts, passions, or 
sexual desire. This verdict is not contrary to the law as given in the instructions or 
to the evidence presented in the case. Therefore, the Defendant has not shown 
that any of the instructions relating to the included offense were sufficiently vague 
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to confuse the jury. As such, his motion for a new trial on those grounds should be 
denied. 
4. Because the Defendant was given sufficient notice of the State's 
request that the jury be instructed on the included offense of Sexual 
Abuse of a Minor, there was no variance between the charging 
document and the jury instructions. 
Due Process requires that a Defendant be given notice of the allegations 
against him so that he can protect himself from subsequent prosecution for the 
same act and so he can prepare a proper defense. See State v. Banks, 11 3 ldaho 
54, 740 P.2d 1039 (Ct.App.1987). The United States Supreme Court has said that 
"conviction upon a charge not made would be a sheer denial of due process." L&
Jonge v. Oreqon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1 937). 
Accordingly, the general rule has evolved that an accused person is denied 
due process by variance between the crime charged in a prosecutor's information 
and the crime upon which a judgment of conviction is entered. E.g., State v. 
Cariaaa, 95 ldaho 900, 523 P.2d 32 (1974). However, there is a well-recognized 
exception to this general rule. At common law, the prosecutor's charge of a 
specific crime was viewed as giving presumptive notice of any lesser included 
offense. State v. Padilla, 101 ldaho 713, 716, 620 P.2d 286, 289 (1980). ldaho 
Courts have explained that a variance between the charging document and a jury 
instruction requires reversal of a conviction only where the defendant was deprived 
of fair notice of the charge against which he must defend or is left open to the risk 
of double jeopardy. See State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 
(Ct.App.2003), State v. Windsor, 11 0 ldaho 41 0, 41 7-1 8, 71 6 P.2d 11 82, 1 189-90 
( I  985). 
In the instant case, the Defendant was given notice of the allegations against 
him by the filing of the information outlining the allegations against him. The filing 
of this information additionally gave him constructive notice of the possibility that 
he could be convicted of any included offense. Additionally, the Defendant was 
given notice that the State was seeking instructions on an included offense by the 
State's requested jury instructions, filed three months prior to trial. In this case, the 
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Defendant cannot claim that his Due Process rights were violated by a lack of 
notice of the allegations against him or the possible crimes for which he could be 
convicted. Further, because the allegations made against him all arise from a 
single transaction, this notice provides sufficient safeguards against the risk of 
being placed in double jeopardy. 
Even assuming that ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) did not prevent his challenge to 
these instructions or that he had objected to these instructions prior to jury 
deliberations, the giving of these instructions did not amount to a Due Process 
violation based upon a variance because of the significant notice provided to him 
by the State and the Court. As such, the Defendant's claim that the instructions on 
the included offense constitute a variance is contradicted by the procedural history 
in this case, which gave him adequate notice under the Due Process clause, and 
the Court should reject his claim that he is entitled to a new trial on these grounds. 
5. The Defendant's reliance on State v. Colwell is misguided because the 
facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case 
as no variance exists between the charging document and the 
evidence presented at trial. 
The Defendant has additionally claimed that under the rationale of the Court's 
opinion in State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 861 P.2d 1225 (Ct.App.1993), the 
conviction in this case should be overturned due to a variance between the 
charging language and the evidence presented at trial. However, this argument 
shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts and the basis for the opinion 
in Colwell. In Colwell, the Defendant was charged with one count of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor. The evidence presented at trial consisted of two main 
components: (1) testimony and prior statements by the named victim that the 
Defendant had sexual intercourse with her, accomplished by genital to genital 
contact during the incident alleged in the information, and (2) testimony and prior 
statements by the named victim that the Defendant had committed numerous prior 
uncharged acts of sexual misconduct, including actions by the Defendant that 
could constitute the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(COCHRAN), Page 10 
The Court in Colwell instructed the jury on the elements of the included offense 
of Sexual Abuse of a Minor despite the objections of the Defendant. However, the 
Court did not instruct the jury that it could only find the Defendant guilty of the 
included offense if they found he committed Sexual Abuse of a Minor during the 
commission of the charged offense of Lewd Conduct. The Defendant was 
acquitted of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, but convicted of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
After the trial, the Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based upon the Court's 
instruction on the included offense. The trial court denied the motion, stating that 
the jury could have concluded that the charged offense of Lewd Conduct did not 
occur, but that the prior acts committed by the Defendant upon the victim did 
occur, thus supporting a conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the claim relating to the instructions on the 
included offense, and stated that the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor could be 
considered by the jury if there is evidence that the included offense occurred 
during the commission of  the charged oflense. See Id. at 565 (emphasis added). 
However, in this instance, the Court failed to instruct the jury that it could only find 
the Defendant guilty of the included offense if it found that such occurred during 
the commission of the charged offense. As such, "the jury was permitted to find 
that the incident giving rise to the charge of lewd conduct had not occurred, but 
nonetheless could find Colwell guilty of sexual abuse" based upon acts which had 
occurred throughout the two year period prior to the alleged incident of Lewd 
Conduct. jcj. 
The Court of Appeals reversed Colwell's conviction based upon the fact that 
the jury was permitted to find him guilty for incidents of sexual abuse that were not 
pled in the charging document. Specifically, the Court found that the "uncharged 
acts should not have been relied upon by the jury as evidence that he committed 
the included offense of sexual abuse of a child." Id. Because the facts did not 
support any allegation that the Defendant committed any sexual acts other than 
genital to genital contact during the commission of the charged offense, the jury 
could not find him guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. The Court based its decision 
upon the fact that the instructions were overbroad and erroneous, constituting plain 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(COCHRAN), Page I I 
- 
error. The Court further indicated that allowing the jury to convict the Defendant 
based upon these prior incidents constituted a variance between the charging 
instrument and the evidence presented at trial, and that it constructively amended 
the information to charge him with "additional crimes that were separate and 
distinct from the crime explicitly alleged." Id. at 566 (emphasis added). 
The instant case can be distinguished from the opinion in Colwell in a 
number of substantial and material areas. First, the Defendant in Colwell objected 
to the inclusion of the instructions on the lesser included offense. As stated above, 
the 2004 amendment to I.C.R. 30(b) prevents the Defendant in this case from 
challenging these instructions due to his failure to object to them. Secondly (and 
most significantly), the evidence supporting the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor 
in Colwell did not occur during the commission of the charged act, but rather were 
evidence of prior, uncharged acts. This variance between the incidents of sexual 
acts which supported the conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Minor, and the incident 
alleged to constitute Lewd Conduct with a Minor was the grounds for the reversal 
of the conviction. In contrast, the evidence in this case showed that the Defendant 
touched Amanda Hixon's breasts during the commission of the acts charged as 
Lewd Conduct. At no time has the evidence changed regarding the fact that the 
acts constituting Sexual Abuse of a Minor occurred during the commission of the 
alleged Lewd Conduct, and at no time was any other prior sexual misconduct 
between the Defendant and the victim presented to the jury. Thus, although the 
charges in Colwell were identical to the charges in this case, the facts and 
evidence presented to the jury are materially distinguishable. 
Finally, the instructions in Colwell were found to be an erroneous statement 
of the law, as they were overly vague and broad, and instructed on an offense that 
did not occur during the commission of the act charged. In the instant case, as 
pointed out above, the instructions correctly and completely instructed the jury on 
the Idaho law applicable to this case, including properly instructing them on the 
included offense. Such a conclusion is supported by the comments of Defense 
counsel at the jury instruction conference indicating that the instructions accurately 
stated the law. Therefore, the facts and legal analysis in Colwell is significantly 
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distinguishable from the facts and legal analysis in the instant case. As such, the 
Defendant's reliance upon this case as legal authority for his motion for a new trial 
is in error, and the Court should recognize that the facts and conclusions in Colwell 
are not applicable to the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the Defendant is prevented from asserting 
error in the jury instructions due to his failure to object thereto prior to the jury 
retiring to consider its verdict. Even assuming the Defendant could validly 
challenge the instructions, the Court correctly instructed the jury on the included 
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor because it was requested by the State, 
stipulated to by the Defendant, and a reasonable view of the evidence supported a 
finding that the Defendant committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
Further, the Court correctly instructed the jury on the difference between Lewd 
Conduct and Sexual Abuse. 
Additionally, because the Defendant was given sufficient notice of the 
State's request that the jury be instructed on the included offense of Sexual Abuse 
of a Minor, there was no variance between the charging document and the jury 
instructions. Finally, the Defendant's reliance on State v. Colwell is misguided 
because the facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the instant 
case as no variance exists between the charging document and the evidence 
presented at trial. Therefore, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny 
the Defendant's motion for a new trial, proceed to sentence the Defendant in 
accordance with the recommendation detailed in the State's Sentencing 
Memorandum, and enter a judgment of conviction on the offense of Sexual Abuse 
of a Minor. 
DATED this c d a y  of October, 2007. 
D uty ttorney General w 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this <day of October 2007. 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum to: 
Danny J. Radakovich 
1624 G. Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax (208) 746-4672 
X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
P 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
X Facsimile 
P 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(COCHRAN). Page 14 - 
- 1 0 4  
Oct-02-2007 08:llam f ram-~UAHU LUUNIY '11 b l  LUUKI ~ ~ U U Y U J L Y ~ Q  I-JUO r U I  J ~ U J J  r - r r u  
ldaho Attorney General FEB 2 4 2007 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JUSTIN t). WHATCOTT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES COCWRAN, 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
) Case No. CR-06-32068 
) 
) STATE'S REQUESTED 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1 
1 
) 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy 
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and 
does hereby request the attached jury instructions be given in the above-entitled case, 
DATED this \ZH' day of February, 2007. 
~$u tyAt to rne~ General 
STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page I STATE'S EXH 
"A" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /gm day of , 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Requested Jury Instructions to: 
Jonathon Hallin 
Wilcox & Hallin 
200 Park Street 
P.O. Box 947 
NcCall, ID 83638 
Fax (208) 634-5880 
$ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
- 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- 
Facsimile 
STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 2 
Oc t-02-2007 08: 1 lam From-I DAN0 COUNTY D l  ST COURT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1 On or about the 30'"ay of March, 2006 
2. In the state of Idaho 
3. The defendant James Cochran committed an act of manual-genital contact upon 
A.J. W. 
4. A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
5. the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or 
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of either of them. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crlme was commrfted, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date 
Oc t-02-2007 08 : 12am From- IDAHO COUNTY Q I  ST COURT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be 
touched. The touching may be through the clothing. 
Oct-02-2007 08: 12am From-IDAHO COUNTV Ql ST COURT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law does not require as an essential element of the crime that the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of either the defendant or A.J.H. be actually aroused, 
appealed to, or gratified. 
WL r-UL-ruur uu: i ~ a m  prom-IVAHU LUUiYIY Ul ST COURT 12089832376 T-308 P. 019/033 F-449 
INSTRUCTION NO 
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct or to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor that A.J.H. may have consented to 
the alleged conduct. 
Bct-02-ZOO7 08:lZam From-IDAHO COUNrY OlSr COUKI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In these jury instructions, the following words have the meanings stated: 
"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the actor, or between 
children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self contact, 
any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other 
person. 
Oct-02-2007 08: 12am From-IDAHO COUNTY DIST COURT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions. Although 
the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they are part of my instructions 
to you. I will now read the verdict form to you. It states. 
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us 
as follows- 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should simply 
sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered Question No. 7 
"Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor in Count 17 
Not Guilty Guilty 
The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should sign 
the verdict form as explained in another instruction. 
Oc t-02-2007 08 : 12am From- IDAHO COUNTV OI ST COURT 12089832376 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES COCHRAN, 
Defendant. 
) 
Case No. CR-06-32068 
We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled action, for 
our verdict, unan~mously answer the question(s) Submitted to us as follows. 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and 
Lascivious Conduct in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty - 
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should 
simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered 
Question No. 1 "Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse 
of a Minor in Count I? 
Not Guilty Guilty 
Next, you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. 
DATED this day of ,2006 
Presiding Juror 
f ,I l: 
A 3 . b  
UJ/ U I /  LUU I 1 L :  3 1  PAA I U U 4  ( U  1 1 L L  lUUC 
,, r U  F" ' 
%(t0 - AT 5\ -O'CLOCK 
,."" OCI 1 5 2004 
oJ 
XiMHO D E P m m m  OP C O ~ ~ ~ ~  
/ 
TO: --'3 %E-s.jj. CoQ-f-R4ri 
Tim me hereby noti3eii fhaf you havepZedguil@ or h e  been foundguilv of a sex oflense 
&xr iMin  L C. 18-8304 and that by remon there08 yo@ are required to register, in wrifing with 
the Shenys O@ce andgive your w m t  a&ess in any county in the sfate of IdahoI which you 
enterjm the pzcrpose of residing there either temporarily, or pemtcrnent&. You m t  register with 
fhe Shen$@s O$ce withkfive (5) &s a j b  coming in to a c m r y  andshalt conrme ro comply with 
thc provisicms of this chapter for life while residing in Idaho, 
Ifyo"" change your &es, you mmt iqfonn fhe law enforcement Qgency wrth whom ycnr last 
registered, of the new udiress, in writing, within five (5;) days of each change. 
@you fail to regisfer or ifyou fail to give notice of a change of address, you will be p i &  of 
afelary and can be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceedfjve (T) years and a fine 
not to excegd $5,000.00. 
DATEDthis Ray of 0~ /'b/3&& , 2-7 
I have read or had read to me and do understand the above notice. 
Signed: 
Witnessed by: 
11/16/20B/ 1 I': 43 12B814b4hf2 DANNY J KAUAKUVJGH PAGE 04 
IDAHO C C U N  7f DISTQICT COUR7 
Danny J. Radakovich 
Radakovich Law Office 
Attclmey fox Defendant 
1624 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 746-8 162 
Idaho State Bax #I991 
IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF TXXE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AXVD FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 CASE NO. CR 2006-32068 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
v. ) DI\SISNY J. RADAKOVKCH 
1 
JAMES A C O C W ,  ) 
) 
Defendant. 1 
D M  J. RADAIK;OVICH, being first duly s w m ,  on oath deposes and says: 
2 .  That your affiant was been retained as the attorney for the Defendant in the above- 
entitled matter; that, immediately following the sentencing in this matter, the defendant vehemently 
expressed to your aEant that he wished your affiant to continue to pursue this matter through the 
courts; 
2. That the Defendant paid an initial retainer and, since then, despite repeated requests, 
has made only token payments since then against the continually rising balance owed; that, at thfs 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DANNY J. RADAKOVXCH 
RADAKOWCH LAW OJWCE 
1624 C Street, 
Lewbton, ID 83501 
DANNY J RADAKOVICH PAGE 05 
point in time, your affiant is owed nearly $7,000.00, which is neaxly double the amount: of the 
original retainer; that, in addition, your affiant has explained to the defendant, through Doris 
Crocker, the amounts needed for up front costs to appeal; 
3. mat your affiant has clearly expressed to the defendant, boa  personally and though 
Dons Crocker, that he is unwilling to proceed further in this matter until brought cumnt; 
4. That your afiant has received vague assurances from Doris Cxocker that she is 
attempting to obtain the funds necessary to proceed and your affiant has spoken with a relative to 
Doris Crocker, who indicated that he would talk to her about helping her with the money; that, 
despite this, no money has been forthcoming; that, even though no money has been forthcoming, 
Doris Crocker has still been requesting that your affiant proceed; that, on or about November 9, 
2007, your amant wrote to the defendant and Doris Crocker to advise that, ifthemonies needed were 
not forthcoming by November 13,2007, he would move to *vxtfidmw; 
5 .  That no monies have been received and your affiant believes that he needs to 
withdraw at this point, not only fox his own sake but also for the sake of the defendant; that the date 
for filing the defendant's in this mattex i s  rapidly approaching and, in your affiant's opinion, an 
appeal should be filed, as well as other avenues be pusued but, if your affiant were to file an appeal, 
he would have to post Qe cost of the clerk's xecord and transcript and the defmdant has not 
advanced the hnds to pay those costs; that your afXiant is not willing to advance those costs, since 
he is already owed a huge sum; 
6.  That, if your affiant withdraws and a public defender is appointed, the appeal could 
be filed timely and the State would bear the cost of the clerk's record and transcript; 
AFrnAVIT OF 
DANNY J. RAIS)MOVXCH 
RADAKOVICH LAW OFFJCE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewlston, ID 83501 
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7. Fuxtheryowaffi~tsaithnot.. 
DATBD thi&d& of November, 2007. 
STATE OFXDAHO 1 
: ss. 
County of Nez Pewe ) 
DANNY J. RADAKOVICH, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says: 
R 
That he has read the foregoing document and well 
therein stated are true, as he verily believes. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
I hereby certiljr that a true 
copy of the foregoing instrument was 
faxed to: 
Justin D. Wiclatcorr 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83 720 
Boise, IZI 83720 
and mailed, first-class postage prepaid, 
to: 
AI;FII)AVlrT OF 
DANNY J. RADMO'VICH 
State of Idaho, residing at Lmiston. 
My commission expires on 1013 1 /07 
RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
James Cochran and Doris 
Crocker 
P. 0. Box 302 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DANNY J. RADAKOWCW 
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RADAKOVICH LAW OFPICE 
1624 G Street, 
Lewiston. 1D 63501 
Adam H .  Green 
Attorney at Law 
ISB No. 6992 
136 N. State Street 
P . O .  Box 246 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
Phone: (208) 983-3089 
Fax: (208) 983-3098 
11 ~ t t o r n e ~  for Defendant 
6 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
) Case No.: CR-2006-32068 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES C O C H M  IN 
Plaintiff, ) SUPPORT OF -ED MOTION FOR 
) REXlUCTION OF SEXI!E%CE 
VS. ) 
JAMES COCHMN, 
) 
1 
Defendant. 
) 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JAMES COCHRAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the above-named Defendant and make the following 
averments upon my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. I was convicted in Idaho County Case No. CR-2006- 
032068 on October 12, 2007, for the crime of Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor Under 16, a felony, pursuant to Idaho Code section 18- 
3. As a result thereof, I was sentenced to the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, in Boise, Idaho, for a 
Affidavit of James Cochran - 1 
- -. 
I1 
period of not less than five years, nor more than 15 years, 
I I consisting of a minimum period of confinement of five years 
IIduring which I am not eligible for parole or discharge, or 
Ilcredit, or reduction of sentence for good conduct (except as 
I! provided by Section 20-LOID, Idaho Code) and a subsequent 
indeterminate period of custody not exceeding 10 years. 
4. I was further ordered to make restitution to the 
Idaho County District Court in the sum of $2,000.00, and to pay 
court costs of $297.50. 
5. Since the date of my conviction in Idaho County Case 
No. CR-2006-032068, there is new or additional information that 
was not available to the Court at the time of sentencing that 
shows that the sentence imposed on October 12, 2007 is 
excessive and unreasonably harsh in light of the primary 
objective of the criminal justice system in protecting society 
and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and 
considers me to be her father. Elizabeth's biological father 
died from cancer and I, for the last years have raised 
Elizabeth as my own daughter. Although I am not married to 
Elizabeth's mother, Doris Crocker, we have been in a monogamous 
relationship for the past & years. 
7 .  Since the date of my conviction, my daughter, 
Elizabeth Crocker, has been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress 
Affidavit of James Cochran - 2 
1 2 3  
disorder, depression, and borderline personality disorder. A 
true and correct copy of a report from Dr. Andrew F. Jones, of 
St. Nary's Hospital in Cottonwood, Idaho, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, confirms this diagnosis. 
8. Elizabeth has also been attending counseling with 
Barbara Graziano, MSM, LCSW, at Camas Professional Counseling, 
in Grangeville, Idaho. It is my understanding that in the 
opinion of Ms. Graziano, it would be in Elizabeth's best 
interests, psychologically, if she were able to see me in a 
supervised context. A true and correct copy of correspondence 
from Barbara Graziano confirming her opinion, is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
9. Elizabeth's mother and my partner, Doris Crocker, 
suffers from serious and debilitation medical conditions as 
shown in the documents I have submitted previously. If she 
were to die while I am incarcerated, Elizabeth would be without 
any parental figure. 
10. Based on the foregoing, the sentence I received on 
October 12, 2007, for the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor 
Under 16, is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary 
objective of protecting society and the related goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. 
11. FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
/ Defendant 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T f  b e f o r e  m e  on t h i s  13 day of  March 
My commission e x p i r e s :  
7- lo- r3 
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State of ldaho v. James A. Cochran 
ldaho County Case No: CR-2006-032068 
- 
ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL 
PO BOX 137,701 LEWISTON S r . 
CO-ONWOOD, ID 83522 
(208) 962-3251 
8 p  I f  n 
EMERGENCY ROOM REPORT i , . "I .. i L _ ' 
PATIENT NAME: CROCKER, ELIZABETH 
HOSPITAL NUMBER: ti2680 
ADDRESS: Kooskia, ID 
PHYSICIAN: Andrew F. Jones, DO 
DATE OF VISIT: 12-29-07 
0 COPY 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: She is a 15-year-ald female patient who is well-known to me. 
She comes in with a superficial self-inflicted, almost scratch, of the left wrist area. It is not really a 
laceration. The patient has a history of PTSD, sexual abuse, and depression. She probably has a 
borderline personality. She is accompanied by her mother, a friend, and her 
psychologistlcounselor. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: As above. 
MEDICATIONS: 1. Birth control pills 
2. Possibly inhalers for asthma 
SOCIAL HISTORY: She may have recently smoked marijuana and possibly smokes cigarettes. 
PHYSICAL W I N A T I O N  
GENERAL: She is actually laughing and is in good spirits. This is totally out of context with her 
self-inflicted injury. 
VITALS: Temperature is 98 degrees; pulse 78; blood pressure 144166; oxygen saturation 100%. 
HEENT: Negative. 
CHEST: Lungs are clear to auscultation. 
HEART: Reguiar rate and rhythm. 
ABDOMEN: Soft. 
NEUROMUSCULAR: Exam shows a superficial scrape over the left radial volar wrist. 
ASSESSMENT: Self-inflicted wound. 
a. Posttraumatic stress disorder. 
b. Depression. 
c. Borderline personality. 
d. We will rule out drug abuse. 
rformed. She is started on Lexapro 10 mg a day. Mom, the 
seled on the black box waming of antidepressants in teens. I 
k she has a good support system. I offered the counselor an 
feeis the patient is in a reasonably safe environment. Further 
ted by clinical course. 
: 01 -03-08 091 5 EMERGENCY ROOM REPORT 
1 2 8  
EXHIBIT B 
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State of ldaho v. James A. Cochran 
ldaho County Case No: CR-2006-032068 
PO Box 627 
March 3,2008 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am writing in regard to Elizabeth Crocker and James A. Cochran. 11. I have been 
seeing Elizabeth for individual psychotherapy for appmxirnately 15 months due to various 
reasons. I am writing to recommend that she be able to see her fatber, and I believe that it 
would be in her best interest psychologically. She has a bond with James that is 
childlparental in nature, and I believe that being able tcl see: him will assist with her mental 
health. However, f also believe that it would be in her best interest to have those visits 
supervised by a profissional who specializes in this type of contact within families. 
Therefore, I am recammending that EUzabeth be able to see James with supervision, 
possibly therapeutic supervision. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. I f  you have any questions or concerns, 
please contact me at (208)983423S. 
Sincerely , 
Barbant Chziano, MSW, LCSW 
ClinjcianlChildren's Program Director 
f NO. 8 9 7  P. 2 
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ldaho AEtorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JUSTIN D. WHATCOTT ISB M444 
Deputy Attorney General 
Speclal Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 332.3096 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF: IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
j 
) Case No. CR06=32068 
vS. j STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO 
JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) REDUCTION OF SENTENCE 
Defendant, 1 
COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submit8 this memorandum in 
opposition to the Defendant's motion for a reduction in sentence under ldaho 
Criminal Rule 35. The State respectfully requests the Court deny the 
Defendant's motion without the necessity of a formal hearing. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS, 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, the Court may reduce or modify a sentence 
within 120 days of the judgment of conviction. Where the legality of a sentence is 
not challenged, a motion for reduction of sentence is simply a plea for leniency 
which the court may grant in its discretion if it decides that the sentence originally 
imposed was unduly severe. &,State v. Suttoq, 106 ldaho 403,679 P.2d 680 
STATE1S MEMORANDUM IN OP~OSIT RULE 35 MOT~ON (COCHRAN), 
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(Ct.App.1984). A defendant seeking a reduction in sentence under Rule 35 is not 
entitled to have a hearing on his motion, as the determination of whether a hearing 
is necessary is within the discretion of the trial court, State v, HoRma~, 1 12 
Idaho 114,730 P,2d 7 034 (Ct'App. 1988). Where a sentence was not excessive 
when pronounmd, the defendant caries the burden of showing that the sentence 
its excessive based upon new or additional information, &g State v. S~rlnaer, 122 
ldaho 544,835 P.2d 1355 (Ct.App. 1892). 
The Defendant, James Cochran, has fled a timely Rule 35 motion seeking 
reduction of sentence. The amended motion does not challenge the legality of the 
sentenw imposed in this case, but rather seeks a reduction based upon "new or 
additional information" that was not available to the court at the time of sentencing. 
The new information provided by the defendant consists of (I) evidence that his 
girlfriend. Doris Crocker, suffers from medical problems relating to diabetes and 
renal failure, and (2) evidence that Ms. Crocker's daughter, Chrissy (whom the 
defendant previously adopted), suffers from psychological problems relating to 
post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, 
The State submits that this evidence is not "new or additional evidence" that 
was unavailable at the time of sentencing, nor is it sufficiently compelling to render 
the defendant's sentence "unduly severe." At the jury trial in this matter, Doris 
Crocker testified as to her medical problems in relation to her recollection of the 
events underlying the criminal charges against the Defendant, Evidence was also 
presented at the jury trial that the Defendant had adopted Ms. Crocker's daughter, 
Chrissy. Furthermore, at the sentencing in this matter, the Defendant pleaded with 
the Court to allow him a period of probation such that he could continue to provide 
financial and emotional support to Ms. Crocker and her daughter. The Defendant 
cited to his close relationship with Ms: Crocker's daughter as evidence that he was 
not a danger to society and that probation was an appropriate sentence. 
Therefore, much of the evidence cited by the Defendant in his Rule 35 
motion has actually been presented before the court in this case. Further, the 
letter prepared by Barbara Grazisno establishes that she has been counseling 
Elizabeth (Chrissy) Crocker since January of 2007. As such, the information 
STATE'S SEMOMNDUM IN OPPOSl 1 TO RULE 35 MOTION (COCHRAM), 
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relating to Chrlssy's psychological problems was available to the Defendant at the 
time of sentencing, and he ohosa not to present such evidence to the Court as 
mitigation. Given that Chrissy's medical histoty indicates a history of sexual 
abuse, and she has previously alleged the Defendant sexually abused her, it is 
likely that her psychological issues are at least in part due to the Defendant's 
actions. It Is further likely that this is the reason why the counselor recommends 
supervised contact between them, Such supervised contact could be 
accomplished by having Chrissy Cracker visit the Defendant at his place of 
incarceration. 
The State further submits that this evidence is of little consequence when 
analyzing whether the sentence for the Defendant is unduly severe. The 
Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced to 15 years 
with 5 years determinate and 10 years indeteninate. This sentence is 10 years 
less than the maximum penalty for sexual abuse of a minor and only 713 of the 
total sentence is fixed. Given that the Defendant provided a 13 year old girl with 
alcohol, had her sleep in his bed with him, and then touched her sexually, this 
sentence is appropriate when weighed against his conduct. Furthermore, at the 
time of sentencing, the Defendant's history revealed 7 prior allegations of sexual 
misconduct, including allegations that he abused Chrissy Crocker, and proof that 
he was dishonorably discharged from the Army for sexually abusing a 5 year old 
girl. As such, the prlmary goal of sentencing this defendant in this case was the 
protection of society. The Defendant's plea to allow a lesser sentence so that he 
can re-connect with one of his prior viotima directly contradicts this goal of 
sentencing, 
CoNCLUsloN, 
The information provided by the Defendant is not new information that was 
unavailable at the time of sentencing. Additionally, this information does not 
render the sentence previously imposed as "unduly severe." Therefore, the 
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the original sentence was 
unduly severe based upon new or additional Information, As such, this Court 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RULE 35 MOTION (COCHRAN), 
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should deny the Defendant's Rule 35 motion wfihout the necessity of a formal 
hearing, The State reape~flully requests that the Court enter such an order, 
DATED thls&aay of March, 2008. 
0 
D e w t t o m e y  General 
CERTIFICATE OF- SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &?day of March 2008, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Oppoaition to 
Rule 35 Motion to: 
Adam Ha Green 
136 N, State Street 
Grangeviile, 11) 83530 
X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
- 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- Facsimile 
y osean Newman, Legal Secretary 
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IN THE DISTRICT ('OURT 01; T I E  - JlJDICIAL DISTRIC'T 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ITOR 7.1% COUNTY OF d- Xo 
STATE 01; IDAf-10, ) 
Plaintiff, 
Case NO. S' 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
VS. 1 DEFENDANT 
1 
* 1 
Defendant. 
- A 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
> ss 
county of2-AAo 1 
/ 
, after first being duly sworn upon hisher oath, deposes 
and says as follows. 
/ 9me ,  c d  
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - I 
Revised: 1011 3!05 
pp 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED This / day of /$fl'*/ , 2 0 p  
SUBSCRIBEI) AN11 SWORN to before me this _i day of AH&,-/ -, 2 0 ~ .  
d 
t.4,-;3 &+,4 *%IBL IG 
(SEAL) 
ilhTotary Public for 1d"ao 
Commission expires: T- (0- 13 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - 2 
Rrv~sed:  I Oil 3105 
I IIEM<RY ('ERTIFY that on the 1 day of 
- - > 
20@, I mailod a true and conact copy of the I)EFENDAN'I.'S AI'FIDAVIT via prison luail 
system for processing to the U.S. niail system to: 
County Prosecuting Attorney 
D ndant 7@' 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - 3 
Revised: 10/13105 
~daho County 
Sheriff's Office 
Larry Dasenbrock, Sheriff John J. Nida, Chief Deputy 
320 West Maln Crdngevllle, ID 83530 
Phone 208-983-1 100 Fax 208-983-1 359 
March 24,2008 
To Whom It May Concern: 
James Allen Cochran 11, date of birth March 17, 1964, served the following days in the 
Idaho County Jail. 
April 24,2006 through May 5,2008 and October 12,2007 through October 30,2007 
when he was released to the State Department of Corrections. 
? 
Trudy L. S1 
Administrative Assistant 
To Protect and Serve 
www.idahocountysheriff.org 
@;%$ 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
,kcI$ 1 , 298 State Appellate F1ublic Defender 
State of ldaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 , 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ldaho 83703 
(208) 334-27 12 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i CASE NO. CR 2006-32068 
1 
V. i S.C. DOCKET NO. 35285 
JAMES A. COCHRAN, 
j 
I NOTICE OF APPWL Defendant-Appellant. 
1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, DENNIS ALBERS, IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 
416 WEST MAIN STREET, P.O. BOX 463, GRANGWILLE, ID, 83530. AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court from the Order Vacating and Re- 
entering Judgment of Conviction entered in the above-entitled action on the 17 '~  
day of July, 2008, the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to ldaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) I 1(c)(l-10). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are: 
(a) Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence? 
(b) Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence? 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. Those portions of the 
record that are sealed are the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) and 
Memorandum of Law (Filed Under Seal) filed March 29, 2007. 
5, Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R. 25(c). The appellant 
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of' the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) Jury Trial held on May 15-18, 2007, including, but not limited to, the 
opening statements, closing arguments, jury instruction 
conferences, and orally presented jury instructions (Court Reporter: 
Sheryl Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of 
Actions); and 
(b) Sentencing Hearing on or about October 12, 2007 (Court Reporter: 
Sheryl Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of 
Actions); and 
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(c) Status Conference held on March 3, 2008 (Court Reporter: Sheryl 
Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of 
Actions). 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record 
pursuant to I.A.R. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to 
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under 
I.A.R. 28(b)(2): 
(a) Transcript of Preliminary Hearing held on May 5, 2006, and filed on 
June 13,2006; 
(b) Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Vacate Trial Setting filed December 4, 2006; 
(c) All proposed and given jury instructions including, but not limited to, 
the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions filed February 12, 
2007, State's Requested Jury Instructions filed February 14, 2007, 
and Jury Instructions Given filed May 18, 2007; 
(d) State's Objection to Defendants Requested Jury Instructions filed 
February 14,2007; 
(e) Affidavit of Danny J. Radakovich filed February 20, 2007; 
(f) Affidavit filed March 28, 2007; 
(g) Memorandum of Law (Filed under Seal) filed March 29, 2007; 
(h) Notice of Jury Trial Witnesses and Exhibits filed May 1 1, 2007; 
(i) Stipulation of Fact filed May 18, 2007; 
(j) Psychosexual Evaluation filed August 21, 2007; 
. --. ---., + * . & I  A M  L U O  J J ~  L V ~ S  STATE APPELLATE PD @ 005/007 
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I I (k) Sentencing Memorandum lodged August 23, 2007; I I 
I (I) Brief in Support of Post Trial Motions lodged August 28, 2007; 
1 
(m) State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial filed October 8, 2007; 
(n) IDOC Notice of Duty to Register by Sex Offender filed October 15, 
2007; 
(0) Affidavit of Danny J. Radakovich filed November 19, 2007; 
(p) Affidavit of James Cochran in Support of Amended Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence filed March 18, 2008; 
(q) State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence lodged March 28, 2008; 
(r) Affidavit of Defendant filed April 3, 2008; 
(s) Affidavit of James Cochran in Support of Amended Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence filed March 18, 2008; 
(t) State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence lodged March 28, 2008; 
(u) Affidavit of Defendant filed April 3, 2008; and 
(sJ Any exhibits, including but hot limited to letters or victim impact 
statements, addendurns to the PSI or other items offered at 
sentencing hearing. 
7. 1 cert'ffy: 
(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the court reporter Shetyl Engler; 
' NT)TlCF nF APPFAI - Pane A 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho 
Code $j§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e)); 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a 
criminal case (I.C. $5 31 -3220, 31 -3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(d) That arrangements have been made with ldaho County who will be 
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is 
indigent, ldaho Code $3 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e); 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to 1.A.R 20. 
DATED this 14 th day of August, 2008. 
State ~ p p e b t e  Public ~ e f e n d w  
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1 lth day of August, 2008, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to; 
DANNY J RADAKOVICH 
1624 G STREET 
LEWISTON lo 83501 
SHERYL ENGLER 
COURT REPORTER 
PO BOX 8068 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
DENNIS ALBERS 
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
416 W MAIN STREET 
PO BOX 463 
GRANGEVILLE ID 83530 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNW GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720 0010 
Hand delivered to ABomey General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
Administrative Assistant 
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